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ABSTRACT 
within the discipline of rhetoric and composition, the 
notion of coherence possesses the status of sine qua non, 
yet this notion has been treated unevenly or been taken for 
granted, much as the process of composing itself was taken 
for granted for the better part of this century. This 
practice has occurred for the following reasons: coherence 
is the "unmarked" condition of speech, and by transfer, also 
the "unmarked" condition of writing; the surface language of 
a composition has traditionally been the focus for solving 
any problems of coherence; and, collateral disciplines have 
not been sufficiently drawn upon in understanding the global 
nature of those elements which cohere a successful 
composition. 
The author posits that virtually all cohering elements 
fall within three global categories, linguistic, cognitive, 
or contextually salient, and, moreover, that these cohering 
elements occur on a continuum that extends from the explicit 
to the implicit. The linguistic category includes 
co-reference, repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis. 
The cognitive category includes the given/new relationship, 
Gestalt, parallel distributed processing, and central 
cognitive processes. The contextually salient category 
iii 
includes warrants, register, central metaphors, sociological 
models, and epistemological frames. 
Such an approach redistributes the burden of our 
understanding coherence from the surface language of a 
composition to a tripartite focus, including not only 
surface language, but also elements beneath it and beyond 
it, thus providing a manageable framework for the analysis 
of coherence, commonly recognized as the most essential 
quality of any composition. 
The study concludes with implications this approach has 
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CHAPTER! 
BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL COHERENCE 
A Historical Sketch of the Concept 
Interest in a coherent text dates from the classical 
period of rhetoric. Aristotle, while not using the term 
coherence or global coherence, clearly presupposed it in his 
Poetics when describing the "organic whole" as "the 
structural union of the parts [of the text] being such that, 
if anyone of them is displaced or removed, the whole will 
be disjointed and disturbed" (35). Horace exhorts "let your 
work be what you will, provided only it be uniform and a 
whole" (68). 
Longinus, in On the Sublime, tells us more: " ... we 
see skill in invention, and due order and arrangement of 
matter, emerging as the hard-won result not of one thing nor 
of two, but of the whole texture of the composition" (43). 
Longinus continues: 
NOw, there inhere in all things by nature 
certain constituents which are part and parcel of 
their substance. It must needs be, therefore, 
that we shall find one source of the sublime in 
the systematic selection of the most important 
elements, and the power of forming, by their 
mutual combination, what may be called one body. 
(69) 
Longinus places particular emphasis on the notion that 
"there inhere in all things by nature certain constituents 
which are part and parcel of their sUbstance." However, he 
does not elaborate on these "certain constituents," nor on 
how they "inhere in all things by nature." Throughout this 
study in global coherence, I shall seek to identify these 
certain constituents and indicate how they cohere a 
composition. 
2 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first 
recorded use of the word coherence in English occurred in 
1604 when Robert Cawdrey published A Table Alphabeticall of 
Hard English Words, in which he listed, "cohaerence, ioning, 
and vniting together" (30); in 1659, Thomas Fuller used the 
word in The Appeal of Injured Innocence: "A naked sentence . 
. . disarmed of the coherence before and after it" (5); and 
in 1678, Thomas Hobbes made use of the word in Decameron 
Physiologicum: or, Ten Dialogues of Natural Philosophy: " 
. the points of Contact will be many (which make the 
coherence stronger)" (ix. 108). 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 
coherence as "the quality or state of cohering . . . 
systematic or methodical connectedness or interrelatedness 
esp. when governed by logical principles" (440); the same 
dictionary defines global as "emphasizing a totality rather 
than the constitutive elements of a totality . . . 
comprehensive . . . total" (965). Accordingly, for the 
purpose of this study, I offer the following working 
definition of the term global coherence: the comprehensive, 
systematic connection of constitutive elements of a 
3 
composition or essay, with a consistent emphasis on both the 
totality of the text and on the interrelatedness of its 
constituents. 
Contemporary Research on Global Coherence 
A review of related scholarship indicates that the 
concept of coherence has been treated in varying degrees and 
from different perspectives in composition and rhetoric, 
with the notion of global coherence often alluded to or 
assumed, but rarely addressed directly or in detail. For 
example, the CCCC Bibliography of Composition and Rhetoric, 
1987 lists "Teaching Coherence Techniques" as a subject in 
its index, yet of 265 entries in the indicated section, one 
entry deals with unity, another entry deals in part with 
organic form, and none deals with coherence or global 
coherence (Lindeman); Research on written Composition, a 
comprehensive review of over twenty years of research, does 
not address coherence or global coherence (Hillocks); the 
1987 Bedford Bibliography for Teachers of Writing lists two 
articles and no books on coherence or global coherence 
(Bizzell & Herzberg). 
Richard Lanham, in his Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 
offers several related terms--composition, eutrepismus, 
ordo, ordinatio, synathroesmus, and taxis--but each is 
concerned with order, arrangement, or the putting together 
of words, sentences, or parts of an oration one with the 
other, not with their interrelatedness at the global level. 
Lanham writes: 
Although extensively discussed in its component 
details, the form of the oration [the text as a whole] 
has not received the scholarly attention it deserves, 
as the form that has governed a good deal of writing 
and speaking not specifically rhetorical. (112) 
Linda Woodson, in her Handbook of Modern Rhetorical 
Terms, does not list coherence or global coherence (nor 
unity nor organic form, which are traditionally associated 
with belles lettres). She does list form, defining it as 
"The structure of the complete piece of discourse or of its 
4 
identifiable parts" and likens it to dispositio in classical 
rhetoric (25). Such a definition, while naturally focusing 
on the structure of the text, fails to focus on the 
comprehensive, systematic interrelatedness of the text's 
constitutive elements. 
The topic of coherence has also been dealt with in 
varying degrees and from different perspectives by authors 
of composition textbooks. Donald Davidson, in his American 
composition and Rhetoric, first published in 1939, devotes 
thirty-three pages to developing coherence in a composition, 
giving examples from distinguished writers which illustrate 
different methods of coherence; Davidson emphasizes cohesion 
between the constituent parts of a composition while also 
emphasizing the work as a whole, noting kinds of overall 
order--"natural," "logical," and "instinctive" (39-40)--as 
well as noting transitional devices between and within 
paragraphs and emphasizing concepts such as "guiding 
purpose" (37) and "free association" (41). Davidson then 
provides two detailed methods for achieving a coherent 
essay, followed by exercises for developing coherence. 
The various authors of the Harbrace College Handbook, 
published in numerous editions since 1941, devote 
thirty-three pages to coherence: all but one of these pages 
focus on coherence at the sentence level. 
5 
James M. McCrimmon, author of the widely used writing 
with a Purpose, published from 1957 to the present, devotes 
five pages to coherence. Although McCrimmon offers the 
student writer sample passages of several paragraphs which 
are annotated for coherence throughout each passage, he 
clearly focuses on coherence at the paragraph level, 
defining coherence as "the integration of sentences within a 
paragraph" (446). For McCrimmon, paragraphs are 
"compositions in miniature" (81), and "The best way to get 
coherence in a paragraph is to think in paragraphs" (92). 
Donald stewart, in his The Versatile writer (1986), 
does not index coherence, clarity, form, or unity, nor does 
he have any sections dealing with these or related concepts. 
In all fairness to stewart, he does draw heavily from 
classical arrangement to foster coherence. 
Maxine Hairston and John Ruszkiewicz, in The Scott, 
Foresman Handbook for writers (1991), also do not index 
coherence, form, or unity, but they do address clarity, 
6 
stating that the "first prize always goes to clarity" (183). 
Hairston and Ruszkiewicz devote twenty-five pages to 
clarity, but they do not address coherence at the essay 
level, instead focusing almost exclusively on coherence 
within, and not between, single paragraphs. 
Unfortunately, errors of coherence have also been 
treated unevenly in composition handbooks, which further 
compounds the challenge of teaching students to write 
globally coherent compositions. Indeed, errors of coherence 
have been treated, and consequently marked, 
indiscriminately. The marking of coherence errors has 
traditionally taken place on errors at the sentence level, 




a. When discussing creativity, a person's ability 
to finish a pun is stressed by John E. Gibson. 
b. When discussing creativity, John E. Gibson 
stresses a person's ability to finish a pun. 
(Hodges & Whitten 250) 
a. We bought gasoline in Arkansas at.a small 
country store which cost $3.12. 
b. At a small country store in Arkansas, we bought 
gasoline which cost $3.12. (Hodges & Whitten 
252) 
Of course, the "a" sentences above do have problems, and the 
"b" versions are more coherent, but Hodges and Whitten's 
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restricting the marking of "coherence" errors to the 
sentence level not only fails to reflect the various 
elements of global cohere Once operating throughout a 
composition, but such treatment of coherence errors also 
restricts the student writer's level of thought--often to 
only the literal level--thus influencing students to think 
at this most basic level. However, composition teachers 
encourage their students to engage in and articulate at 
various levels of thought--and thus various levels of 
writing--beyond the literal level; composition teachers want 
essays to represent higher-order thinking--interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, and creativity--and this higher-order 
thinking demands language use beyond the literal level, a 
level which often does not rise above the phrase or sentence 
level. 
Some recent handbooks, such as Corder and Ruszkiewicz's 
Handbook of Current English, published in 1985, ignore 
coherence errors at the sentence level and instead, focus 
solely on coherence errors at the paragraph level, either 
within a paragraph or between paragraphs, as the following 
examples illustrate: 
[l:3a] (focus on intra-paragraph coherence) 
Many people today believe that objectionable 
movies should be censored by federal or local 
agencies. The recent emphasis in American 
films on immorality and violence is outrageous. 
They are undermining our nation's morals and 
our prestige abroad, according to many people. 
There may be some truth here. I agree with the 
diagnosis, but I cannot accept the cure. 
Censorship poses a greater threat to a democracy, 
in my opinion. 
[1:3b] (focus on intra-paragraph coherence) 
Many people today believe that objectionable 
movies should be censored by federal or local 
agencies. These critics have been outraged by the 
recent emphasis in American films on immorality 
and violence. Such films, according to them, are 
undermining our nation's morals and our prestige 
abroad. This may be true. However, although I 
agree with their diagnosis, I cannot accept their 
cure. It seems to me that censorship poses a 
greater threat to a democracy than objectionable 
entertainment. (Corder & Ruszkiewicz 464-65) 
Due to the changes noted, example "b" possesses 
improved coherence. For inter-paragraph coherence, Corder 
and Ruszkiewicz offer the passage below. 
[1:4] (focus on inter-paragraph coherence) 
Putting food into the weightless body has 
always been a special challenge for NASA. For a 
while no one was sure if a human could eat 
normally in zero-g. There were those who worried 
that when John Glenn made the first American 
around-the-world space flight he wouldn't be able 
to swallow his food in weightlessness and would 
choke to death. Once Glenn returned to earth, his 
stomach full, his throat clear, extraterrestrial 
meal planning began in earnest. Space meals have 
progressed from such items as gelatin-coated 
coconut cubes and peanut cubes to complete 
heat-and-serve meals on board Skylab and the space 
shuttle. 
Space meals are not prepared so. much as 
assembled. All the food is precooked and is 
either canned, dehydrated, or packed in 
aluminum-backed plastic envelopes called flex 
pouches. Because it's impossible to pour water 
in zero gravity (it congeals into silvery balls 
that drift around in a spacecraft), dehydrated 
food is revived by squirting water through a 
needle into the sealed plastic pouches. Each 
pouch has a flexible plastic top that lets the 
cook knead the water into the dried food. 
Liquids are drunk through a straw with a clamp 
attached to keep the straw pinched shut when not 
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in use. All are in containers shaped to fit 
neatly into a compartmentalized and magnetized 
food tray, where they are anchored in place by 
Velcro tape. 
Weightlessness affects not only how food is 
packaged, but also what kind of food is inside. 
Even without gravity, it is possible to eat some 
foods off an open plate with a fork or spoon. 
Meals with sauces or gravies work especially well 
because they tend to stick to the plate and not 
float away. The skylab astronauts, who tested 
out many space meals, found some were disasters. 
In one report to Earth, the first crew crossed 
chili off their eating schedule. Every time they 
opened a container of it, there was an explosion 
of food: "Great gobbets of chili go flying all 
over; it's bad news."--Douglas Colligan, "The 
Light stuff" (Corder & Ruszkiewicz 465-66) 
Corder and Ruszkiewicz, as do many other handbook 
authors, choose not to provide a multi-paragraph passage 
flawed with coherence errors, but they do point out that 
example [1:4] employs repetition of "key words" and 
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"synonyms" in order to effect greater coherence (466). Note 
should be made, however, that inter-paragraph coherence is 
also effected by other key elements of coherence, such as 
reference, substitution, ellipsis, and conjunction, and 
these elements need to be addressed. 
Despite the uneven treatment given the notion of 
coherence in the field of composition, it.was one of six 
criteria used to evaluate freshman compositions in the 
influential Miami of Ohio study (Kerek, Daiker, & Morenberg 
1111); like ancient rhetoricians such as Aristotle, Horace, 
and Longinus, modern rhetoricians also believe coherence is 
the sine qua non of any composition. If this is the case, 
then how is it that compilers of current handlists of 
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rhetoric and composition terminology do not mention or index 
coherence (e.g., Lanham; Woodson)? How is it that 
researchers of the past twenty years in composition and 
rhetoric do not address coherence (e.g., Hillocks)? How is 
it that bibliographers list coherence as a category with 265 
entries but none deals with coherence (e.g., Lindeman)? How 
is it that college handbooks indiscriminately assign a 
single proofreading symbol, "coh," to a multitude of errors 
at the sentence level (dangling modifiers, misplaced 
modifiers, faulty parallelism, etc.), at the intra-paragraph 
level, and at the inter-paragraph level (e.g., Hodges & 
Whitten; Hairston & Ruszkiewicz; Corder & Ruszkiewicz)? 
The reasons the notion of coherence has been treated so 
unevenly while continuing to possess the status of sine quo 
non are three-fold: 
Humans naturally assume that things "make sense"; 
"making sense" is the "unmarked" condition or quality of 
language processing. Because coherence is so much a 
requisite of language processing, humans take it for granted 
as much as they do the solidity of the ground beneath their 
feet. Coherence is part-and-parcel of normal speech; humans 
do not communicate not to be understood, but instead to be 
understood and to understand. Coherence is assumed not only 
of speech production, but also of written-language 
production; however, the notion of coherence in a written 
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text is much more involved than the notion of coherence in a 
spoken utterance, as this study will demonstrate. 
Secondly, composition teachers have focused too long on 
the "surface language" of the text. They read a sentence 
constructed with a misplaced modifier and pause to wonder 
just what is meant, but that experience does not justify 
restricting their treatment of coherence to the sentence 
level, and often, therefore, to the literal level of 
language; they must instruct their student writers to go 
beyond the literal level of language and thought so that the 
student writers will not only think at the analytic, 
interpretive, evaluative, and creative levels, but also 
articulate at these higher levels of thought in globally 
coherent essays. Composition teachers appropriately mark 
the incorrect use of therefore in student papers, but they 
are remiss if they do not encourage student writers to look 
at the underlying logical relationships of the clauses the 
student writers are connecting, for that will give the 
students an increased understanding of how parts of a 
composition cohere in fundamental, cognitive ways. 
composition teachers correctly alert their student writers 
to the liabilities of sexist language and to the proper form 
of a business letter, but it is far better to also teach 
them about the implicit but overarching, powerful, and 
ubiquitous influence contextual salience exerts in their 
culture, and thus in their compositions. 
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Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of 
discovering in the particular case all the available means 
of persuasion," and clearly, such a definition is a very 
inclusive one (Aristotle xxxvii); in a personal interview, 
Jim Corder defined rhetoric as "any purposive use of 
language"; clearly, this definition is another very 
inclusive one. Whether one subscribes to Aristotle's 
definition or to Corder's definition or to both, one must 
agree that the discipline of composition and rhetoric is 
very inclusive, and that the language one uses and the 
resources one draws upon in fashioning a coherent text go 
far beyond the actual language of the text. Composition 
teachers therefore must not limit themselves, nor their 
language, to a text-bound view of coherence; they must not 
place all the burden of coherence on the text's surface 
language. Instead, as they teach student writers to compose 
globally coherent texts, they must alert the student writers 
to the germane aspects of language use which the text's 
surface language pre-supposes at the cognitive level, 
instantiates at the literal level, and intimates at the 
sociological level. 
A third reason the notion of coherence has been treated 
so unevenly while continuing to possess the status of sine 
qua non is that composition teachers have not followed the 
lead of linguists, for as linguists developed a keener and 
deeper insight into what language is and how it works, their 
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field grew beyond general or descriptive linguistics to 
sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and neurolinguistics, 
for example. Teachers of composition and rhetoric have not 
sufficiently availed themselves of this growth in 
linguistics. No doubt, composition teachers have made great 
strides in moving from product to the process approach, in 
reviving the essay to a status on par with literary 
interpretation, and in achieving acceptance of 
writing-across-the-curriculum. Such strides have seen the 
discipline of composition and rhetoric become increasingly 
interdisciplinary. These gains are real and have been good 
for both teachers and students alike, but composition 
teachers have not made similar gains in their understanding 
of the most necessary quality of a composition--global 
coherence. Nonetheless, they can make significant gains if 
they appropriately draw from advances offered them by their 
many collateral disciplines. They can draw, for example, 
from the increased understanding provided in 
psycholinguistics by using the concept of top down 
processing. As argued above, composition teachers have too 
long focused primarily on the surface language of student 
papers, and this has often led them into a bottom up 
approach to the teaching of writing: sentences first, 
paragraphs next, then a five-paragraph theme, then a genuine 
essay. However, by using the concept of top down processing 
in conjunction with bottom up processing (a dual focus which 
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in itself more accurately reflects how humans process 
language}, teachers of composition might significantly 
improve student writing. Further, by taking into account 
top down and bottom up aspects of global coherence, 
composition teachers might also complement recent 
developments in learning theory which suggest that humans as 
individuals have different cognitive styles, that some of us 
begin a composition with "the big picture" and then "flesh 
it out," while others begin with several small observations 
and details and then build upon them until a coherent 
composition emerges. 
Composition teachers can also begin to treat the notion 
of coherence more evenly if they look not just at the 
surface language of a composition, but beneath it and beyond 
it. Composition teachers must look beneath the surface 
language to the underlying cognitive processes that all 
humans share, and they must look beyond the surface language 
of the composition to the overarching, powerful, and 
ubiquitous influence contextual salience exerts in the 
culture, and thus, in the compositions of students: 
composition teachers simply cannot allow the surface 
language of the composition to bear the entire burden of 
coherence. Lastly, composition teachers can begin to treat 
the notion of coherence more evenly if they draw more and 
more from what is offered to them by those in their 
collateral disciplines, for the study of language, and by 
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extension, the study of the global coherence of a 
composition, subsumes a multitude of disciplines and is not, 
as once was thought, solely relegated to "the Department of 
English." 
Three Lines of Inquiry 
How best, then, can composition teachers make certain 
they do not assume that the global coherence of a 
composition is an a priori condition? How best can 
composition teachers broaden their focus with regard to the 
various aspects of global coherence so that they carefully 
examine not only the surface language of a composition, but 
also the cognitive relationships which underlie the surface 
language, as well as the contextually salient aspects which 
overarch the surface language? Finally, how best can 
composition teachers utilize appropriate concepts from 
collateral disciplines? 
In order to make certain that they do not assume that 
the global coherence of a composition is a priori, 
composition teachers need an approach which is sufficiently 
complex to remind them constantly that the cohering aspects 
of a composition cannot be taken for granted, but instead 
demand active cognitive and linguistic skills. This 
approach, however, ought not be so complex that composition 
teachers lose sight of the comprehensive, global nature 
required of a successful composition. In order to examine 
16 
carefully not only the surface language of a composition, 
but also the cognitive relationships which underlie the 
surface language, as well as the contextually salient 
aspects which overarch the surface language, composition 
teachers need an approach which assures balanced and 
consistent attention to all these aspects as they 
co-function to enable global coherence. In order best to 
use collateral disciplines, composition teachers need an 
approach which inherently surveys and filters these 
disciplines for relevant concepts. Numerous works within 
and outside the discipline of rhetoric and composition which 
deal with cohesion, coherence, and related concepts suggest 
that such an approach consists of three "global categories." 
These three global categories represent three major 
perspectives of coherence that, for the purposes of this 
study, I categorize as the linguistic, the cognitive, and 
the contextually salient perspectives. 
The Linguistic Perspective 
The linguistic perspective deals with those aspects of 
global coherence manifested the most frequently and often 
the most explicitly in a text; such aspects are manifested 
through and by a text's own language in words meant to be 
understood at the literal level. Such cohesive language 
often consists of frequently used words infrequently 
associated with coherence, such as the, she, it, so, and do. 
17 
Characteristic of the linguistic perspective is Halliday and 
Hasan's Cohesion in English, which posits five cohering, 
"non-structural components of the semantic system" of 
English: reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and 
lexical cohesion (29). Halliday and Hasan argue that these 
components figure centrally in the coherence of a text. 
In treating the following passage from Alice in 
Wonderland, Halliday and Hasan identify the components of 
reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical 
cohesion as they function to cohere the passage: 
[1:5a] The Cat only grinned when it saw Alice. 
"Come, it's pleased so far," thought Alice, and 
she went on. "Would you tell me, please, which way I 
ought to go from here?" 
"That depends a good deal on where you want to 
get to," said the Cat. 
"I don't much care where--" said Alice. 
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said 
the Cat. 
"--so long as I get somewhere" Alice added as 
an explanation. 
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if 
you only walk long enough." (in Halliday & Hasan 30) 
Working from the last lines to the first, Halliday and 
Hasan argue that "do that" SUBSTITUTES for "get somewhere," 
which is tied through LEXICAL COHESION to "where you want to 
get to," which is related also through LEXICAL COHESION to 
"which way I ought to go." "Oh" serves as a CONJUNCTION for 
"--so long as I get somewhere" and "you're sure to do that," 
and "then" also serves as a CONJUNCTION as it coheres "I 
don't much care where--" to It ••• it doesn't matter which 
way you go." In Alice's second utterance, ELLIPSIS coheres 
"where" with the Cat's second utterance " ... where you 
want to get to," and LEXICAL COHESION ties Alice's "care" 
with the Cat's "want." REFERENCE ties "that" in the Cat's 
18 
first utterance to Alice's question ". which way I ought 
to go," and, again, REFERENCE ties "it" of Alice's interior 
monologue to "The Cat" in the first line of the passage. 
Throughout the passage, from its beginning to its end, 
REPETITION ties "Alice" and "the Cat" into a "cohesive 
chain" (30). 
If, in the illustration on the following page, brackets 
enclose the words in the passage which cohere through ties 
and ALL-CAPITALS denote the words which tie (the 
conjunctions, at least in this passage), and lines of 
coherence are drawn connecting the elements of each cohesive 
tie, the manner in which this passage is bound together 
begins to take shape. The elements of coherence in this or 
any passage effect lines of coherence which exert a binding 
and unifying force not only between themselves, but also on 
much of the content within them or near the lines of 
coherence. 
1 19 
(l:Sb] (The Cat] only grinned when (it] saw [Alice]. 
~ __________________ ~ ________________ J l~~ 
"Come, (it] I s pleased so far," thought I 
(Alice], and she went on. "Would you tell me, 
you 
I 
"(I don't much care [where]]--" said 
I I (Alice]. I 
"THEN [it doesn't matter which way you 
I 
go]," said [the Cat]. 
, .r---~ 
"--(so long as I (get somewhere]]" [Alice] 
added as an explanation. 
"OH, you're sure to (do that]," said (the 
I 
Cat], if you only walk long enough." 
Thus Halliday and Hasan's approach begins to shed light 
on the linguistic aspects of global coherence, but the 
analysis of the sample passage also raises questions. For 
example, pronouns sUbstitute for Alice or the Cat ten times, 
and it sUbstitutes once for an entire clause ("I don't much 
care where [I get to].") Are these prono:uns, which serve as 
substitutes for Alice or the Cat, and which Halliday and 
Hasan do not note, a part of the "cohesive chain" 
represented by the repetition of Alice or the Cat? 
One might observe, too, that repetition is not included 
among Halliday and Hasan's five elements of cohesion, yet it 
serves a consistent cohesive function throughout the 
passage. 
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Is repetition considered an element of cohesion? 
If so, is it also "non-structural"? If not, is it 
"structural"? What are the criteria for determining if a 
cohesive element is "non-structural" or "structural"? 
Interestingly, of Halliday and Hasan's five sub-categories 
of cohesion, (or six, if one counts repetition), only 
one--conjunction--has words in the text which actually tie, 
i.e., THEN and OH, while the remaining sub-categories of 
cohesion do not act as ties, but instead effect coherence by 
representing a cohesive tie brought about by a structural 
operation (i.e., substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference), 
or by a semantic relation (i.e., lexical cohesion, and 
possibly, repetition.) will this observation hold as one 
analyzes additional texts? If so, how will this affect the 
classification of cohesive categories? Yet another question 
is what do Halliday and Hasan mean by "reference," since 
reference is a feature of any symbol, word, phrase, or 
clause? Perhaps more importantly at this juncture in this 
study of global coherence is, what are the criteria that 
determine if an element functions in the linguistic, 
cognitive, or contextually salient global categories? These 
and other questions are addressed in chapters two, three, 
and four of this study. 
The Cognitive Perspective 
Whereas aspects of the linguistic perspective are 
frequently and most explicitly manifested in a composition, 
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the aspects of the second perspective of global coherence, 
the cognitive perspective, are often manifested in a liminal 
manner and serve as a threshold at which distinction between 
the explicit and implicit blurs. However, the essential 
bridging effect of these aspects is present in every text. 
The cognitive perspective is exemplified through such 
concepts as central cognitive processes, natural semantic 
domains (i.e., those domains which are not socially 
constructed but which occur in nature, such as a taxonomy in 
biology), Gestalt, and the relationship between given and 
new information. One example from the cognitive perspective 
is the following text of a very familiar routine: 
(text #1) You wake up. You get out of bed. You go to the 
bathroom. You put on your clothes. You eat. 
You go to work. 
(text #2) First, you wake up. Then, you get out of bed. 
Next, you go to the bathroom. After that, you 
put on your clothes. Then, you eat. Next, you 
go to work. 
(text #3) You go to the bathroom. 
You eat. You wake up. 
on your clothes. 
You get out of bed. 
You go to work. You put 
(text #4) First, you go to the bathroom. Then, you get 
out of bed. Next, you eat. After that, you 
wake up. Then, you go to work .. Next, you put 
on your clothes. 
Members of most cultures or nationalities would find 
texts #1 and #2 globally coherent; it is also quite likely 
that these same persons would have great difficulty in 
finding text #3 or #4 globally coherent. Text #2 is 
globally coherent, and one might posit that such coherence 
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is effected by the logical connectors first, then, next, and 
after that. However, one might argue that text #1 is also 
globally coherent, without explicit logical connectors such 
as first, then, next, and after that. (An additional 
argument can also be made: the explicit logical connectors 
in text #4 do not render the text globally coherent.) How 
then can text #1 be judged globally coherent? 
One response might be that the actions described in 
text #1 are so familiar as to be almost universal, and 
indeed that is so. Following this line of argument, text #1 
is globally coherent without the explicit logical connectors 
employed in text #2 because the actions in text #1 are 
virtually universal for all humans. However, the actions in 
text #3 are the very same actions as those in text #1, but 
text #3 is not globally coherent. Only the sequence of 
actions is different, and therein lies the key to the global 
coherence of text #1 and text #2: the SEQUENCE of the 
actions, i.e., a sequence in time and space that one has 
corne to regard as logical, and not the actions alone, allow 
for the global coherence of the text. Such a sequence is an 
example of one of at least fifteen central cognitive 
processes; other central cognitive processes include but are 
not limited to contrast, spatializing, comparing, positing 
causes and/or effects, and classification, and are used to 
process information, are interconnected, and are sensitive 
to one's belief system (Fodor 104). Central cognitive 
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processes, together with cognitive aspects such as Gestalt 
and the given/new relationship, form a significant part of 
the cognitive perspective of global coherence and will be 
treated in greater detail in chapter three of this study. 
The Contextually Salient Perspective 
The third perspective of global coherence, that of 
contextual salience, is usually manifested in the text 
through such implied but powerful, fundamental, and 
culturally-related concepts as epistemological frames, 
central metaphors, sociological models, and warrants. The 
following example illustrates how contextual salience, or, 
in this case, subcultural salience, dramatically affects 
global coherence through the lexicon: 
When the tool locates the object, he may name that 
location to the stalls, saying in an undertone "left 
bridge" or "right bridge" or "kiss the dog," or 
whatever instructions may be necessary to inform the 
stalls, so that they can put the patient into position 
for the tool to operate. The tool may likewise 
communicate with the stalls during the operation, 
giving them instructions such as "roust" or "come 
through," or "stick," or "stick and split me out" or 
"turn him for a pit," etc. All tools give the stalls 
an office or signal when they remove the object. . . . 
To this researcher "it seems incredible" that the 
patient does not realize that the language is focused 
almost exclusively on him. (adapted from Maurer 53-54) 
Here is evinced one prominent part of the context, the 
subculture, implicit and not mentioned in the text, but 
which makes salient a specific semantic domain and manifests 
explicitly in the text a specialized vocabulary. Such 
specialized vocabulary is an essential element of the global 
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coherence of this particular text, and the explicit-implicit 
relationship between specialized vocabulary representing 
semantic domains and the subculture also holds for entire 
texts written across the curriculum, whether in business, 
law, science, technology, or the arts. 
The earlier passage from Alice in Wonderland indicates 
that the linguistic elements of global coherence are the 
elements used the most frequently and the most explicitly. 
Similarly, the passage describing the early morning routine 
and its sequence of familiar actions illustrates how the 
cognitive elements of global coherence serve bridging or 
liminal functions, at times explicit and at times implicit. 
In like manner, the above passage using the argot of 
pickpockets illustrates that the elements of the 
contextually salient perspective rely on culturally-related 
concepts such as epistemological frames, central metaphors, 
sociological metaphors, and warrants. 
Because the contextually salient perspective of global 
coherence is culturally related, it often seems to be 
omnipresent and ubiquitous. Paradoxically, the contextually 
salient perspective is often the most implicit aspect of 
global coherence, never manifesting itself explicitly or 
directly, but instead, manifesting itself implicitly in the 
form of epistemological frames, central metaphors, 
sociological metaphors, and warrants. Nor is the 
contextually salient perspective manifested in language 
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meant to be understood at the literal level, as in the 
linguistic and cognitive global categories, but in language 
meant to be understood at the interpretive level in the form 
of such key components of a composition as word choice, 
grammatical structure (voice, nominalizations, etc.), 
rhetorical pattern of sentences, thesis placement, and 
prevalence of particular central cognitive processes (often 
resulting in emphasis on a particular arrangement or pattern 
of thought). These and other aspects of contextual salience 
are treated in greater detail in chapter four of this study. 
Summary of the Study 
Those scholars operating from a linguistic perspective 
(e.g., Halliday & Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels) seem to 
emphasize aspects of global coherence which are more 
explicit in a composition; such aspects might best be 
studied from the vantage points of descriptive or text 
linguistics. 
Those scholars operating from a cognitive perspective 
(e.g., Winterowd, Bruner, and Fodor) seem to emphasize 
aspects liminal in nature, at times manifested explicitly in 
a text, and at times not, but whose bridging effect is 
present in every text; such aspects might best be studied 
from the vantage points of language and cognition, cognitive 
science, and cognitive psychology. 
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Those scholars operating from a perspective of 
contextual salience (e.g., Hirsch, st. Clair, and Toulmin) 
seem to emphasize what are often manifestations of very 
implicit aspects of global coherence; such aspects might 
best be studied from the vantage points of sociolinguistics, 
sociology, and ethnology. 
The purposes in this study, then, are twofold: 
First, I seek to show that virtually all 
significant aspects of coherence are usefully 
understood as falling within three global categories: 
linguistic, cognitive, and contextually salient. This 
approach achieves several ends: 
a) it provides a manageable framework for the 
analysis of global coherence 
b) it redistributes the burden of global coherence 
from the traditional focus on the surface 
language of the composition to a tripartite focus 
which includes not only the surface language of 
the composition, but also the global factors 
beneath the surface language and those which 
function beyond the surface language 
c) it draws from the disciplines of psychology and 
sociolinguistics to validate the cognitive and 
contextually salient aspects of global coherence 
d) elements of global coherence may be identified 
and assigned to either the linguistic, cognitive, 
or contextually salient categories; these 
elements are then located on a continuum in terms 
of their explicitness or implicitness 
e) it offers insight into how a-c above will assist 
the teacher of composition in further 
understanding global coherence, and consequently, 
assist in the teaching of student writers as they 
wrestle with expressing themselves and the worlds 
about them in Edited American English 
f) a visual metaphor will be offered, illustrating 
what Longinus alluded to: "the whole texture of 
the composition" formed by the "mutual 
combination" of "the most important elements" 
into "what may be called one body" (69). 
The second purpose of these study is to raise 
implications for teaching composition. 
This study of global coherence is inherently 
interdisciplinary. In order to study the comprehensive, 
systematic connection of constitutive elements of a 
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composition or essay, with a consistent emphasis on both the 
totality of the text and on the interrelatedness of its 
constituents, I will draw from classical rhetoric, text 
linguistics, descriptive linguistics, sociology, 
anthropology, ethnology, language and cognition, cognitive 
psychology, and cognitive science. 
In addition, such an approach to global coherence may 
involve a significant amount of re-shuffling of factors 
traditionally viewed as linguistic or even textual. For 
example, subordinate conjunctions such as therefore and thus 
have traditionally been viewed as linguistic, but therefore 
and thus actually represent one of at least sixteen central 
cognitive processes, that of positing causes or effects, and 
from the view of the composition teacher or student, the 
best use and cohering qualities of words such as therefore 
or thus might be better grasped if they are treated from the 
cognitive perspective. Regarding the contextually salient 
perspective, the re-shuffling of global coherence factors 
might be seen in the weighing of some extra-textual features 
on an equal (or more-than-equal) basis when compared to 
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textual features. For example, one might weigh the central 
metaphor dominating a student writer's perspective more than 
one would weigh his or her choice of prevalent central 
cognitive processes because the central metaphor might 
influence not only word choice, but also tone and voice, as 
well as arrangement. 
In an effort to articulate the elements of global 
coherence and investigate the explicit/implicit dynamic of 
these elements within a text, I will turn initially to the 
linguistic perspective, for that has been the traditional 
perspective from which coherence in the field of composition 
has been viewed. By reviewing three major works treating 
cohesion and coherence, I will seek to identify along an 
explicit-implicit continuum a common set of linguistic 
elements that fundamentally contributes to the global 
coherence of a text. These linguistic elements are 
manifested frequently and quite explicitly through and by a 
text's own language, in words meant to be understood at the 
literal level of language. such words serve not only as 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first 
section, an overview of the linguistic perspective, draws 
upon three major works treating cohesion and coherence in 
order to identify linguistic elements of global coherence. 
The second section develops, in effect, a handlist of 
linguistic elements of global coherence. The third section 
of the chapter relates these elements to an explicit-
implicit continuum as it functions to enable global 
coherence in compositions and essays. 
Overview of the Linguistic Perspective 
Several motives drive the investigation of global 
coherence from a linguistic perspective. One motive is that 
the structural operations which enable cohesive ties are 
manifested in the surface language of a text very frequently 
and very explicitly. Unlike the cohesive ties we will 
encounter in the cognitive and culturally salient 
perspectives of global coherence, whose explicit presence in 
the surface language of a text is often optional or are not 
even alluded to in the text of a composition, every 
structural operation which enables a cohesive tie must be 
explicitly represented in the surface language of a text by 
32 
overt markers (or by the zero marker in the case of 
elliptical constructions). In short, for every structural 
operation enabling a cohesive tie in a text, one will find a 
specific word or group of words in the text whose primary 
function is not content, but coherence. 
Moreover, because markers of these structural 
operations, along with additional markers of coherence such 
as subordinators and coordinators at the clause and 
paragraph levels, appear the most frequently and the most 
explicitly in the surface language of a text, they are the 
most easily identified. Given the tendency in this century, 
at least in America if not in western Europe, towards the 
analytic rather than the holistic, and the concomitant 
impetus to quantify data, scholars such as M. A. K. Halliday 
and Ruquaiya Hasan have focused on the highly frequent and 
explicit surface-language markers which denote the 
underlying, cohering structural operations of a text. 
Further, it must be added, this focus has been 
predominantly on cohesive ties at the sentence or clause 
level as the ties themselves function at the sentence level, 
within a paragraph, across paragraphs, or throughout an 
entire text or composition. Such primacy of the sentence 
level has been disputed and called a fundamental error in 
compositional theory. Robert de Beaugrande, for example, 
argues that the sentence is not "the primary unit of speech 
production and comprehension," and cites several scholars to 
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bolster his position (Ohmann; Bever, Lackner, & Kirk; 
Levelt). However, de Beaugrande's argument rests on the 
premise that if the sentence is not the primary unit in 
producing speech, then the sentence is also not the primary 
unit in producing a written text, but this argument does not 
hold, for writing is not speech written down. 
To be sure, both speech and writing use symbols 
systematically, but they operate in significantly different 
contents. Normal, unrehearsed speech assumes, among other 
things, immediate audience response in kind, the complement 
of prosodic features, and the complement of gestures, all 
constrained by the working memory's limits of text length 
and complexity. Consequently, a transcript of a spoken 
dialog often reveals an uneven progression toward the 
dialog's goal, with the progression characterized by 
frequent fits and starts, of numerous stops and returns to 
the last, mutually understood point the parties of the 
dialog share. Such a progression is not smooth, and 
although produced linearly, i.e., through the speech stream, 
the progression is not linear. 
Writing, on the other hand, subsumes all of the above 
characteristics of speech production as the writer engages 
in an inner dialog with self or with cohorts in an attempt 
to produce a written text, but the act of producing a 
composition transcends the essential and subtended 
characteristics of speech production because a written 
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composition operates in a significantly different context 
than does speech; the context of the written composition 
cannot assume immediate audience response, prosodic 
features, or physical gestures, nor is the working memory as 
constrained as in speech processing; additionally, the 
composition, in order to be successful, must exhibit a 
smooth progression of thought, and do so within the 
parameters of punctuated linearity. 
In order for the composition to do this, certain 
discrete units, with cognitive boundaries, are necessary, 
without which punctuated linearity gives way to 
undifferentiated linearity, to a gigantic run-on of notions 
and concepts which has only a faint semblance of 
connectivity and which fails utterly to cohere in a global 
manner. Thus, the written text must have a basic 
constituent which enables its linearity to be punctuated 
consistently according to appropriate cognitive boundaries. 
This smallest constituent manifests coherence through 
subject-predicate relations, to use the traditional terms, 
or through the given-new relationship, to use more recent, 
cognitive terms. This "smallest" constituent is the clause. 
It is both natural and logical for scholars interested 
in coherence from the linguistic perspective to focus 
predominantly on cohesive ties at the clause level as the 
ties themselves function within a sentence, within a 
paragraph, across paragraphs, or throughout an entire text 
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or composition. In point of fact, this "smallest" 
constituent is incredibly complex, its study having spawned 
entire theoretical grammars in linguistics, such as 
transformational-generative grammar, and detailed 
pedagogical approaches in composition, such as sentence 
combining. 
Despite this focus on the clause, we will not follow 
the Katz-Fodor argument that discourse, or in our case, a 
composition or essay, consists basically of an extended and 
conjoined sentence. Rather, our approach to the elements of 
global coherence will follow more inclusive arguments such 
as those advanced by members of the Prague School, Kenneth 
Pike, William Labov, Dell Hymes, and others: expressed 
language can be fully understood only when seen as a human 
action taken within a sUbsuming context with both explicit 
and implicit elements contributing to the coherence of the 
linguistic expression. Or, as Stephen Witte and Lester 
Faigley write from a more recent and more rhetorical 
perspective, "coherence defines those underlying semantic 
relations that allow a text to be understood" and that 
"coherence conditions are governed by the writer's purpose, 
the audience's knowledge and expectations, and the 
information to be conveyed," among other things (202). 
Of all the reasons which motivate scholars to 
investigate global coherence from a linguistic perspective, 
perhaps the principal reason is a fascination with language, 
36 
and the marvelous, but often taken-for-granted feat of 
learning a language. Because of the time and complexity 
required in learning a first language, Nature has endowed 
humans with an extended neoteny--the most extended of all 
mammals--to enable them to learn, among other things, this 
complicated thing called language. Amazingly, humans do so 
at such a young age that most of them take language for 
granted and do not even remember learning it. By the age of 
five or so, humans have acquired a fairly complete grammar, 
as well as a working vocabulary of several thousand words, 
all subject to an infinite number of structural combinations 
in various contexts and for various purposes. Remarkably, 
also by this early age, these phenomenal feats of language 
production and comprehension have become automatic within 
humans, so much so that they think it as natural to use 
language as it is to eat and breathe. Because it is so 
natural and automatic, it often seems that to talk is to 
think, to think is to talk, such that one's inner thoughts 
and one's "outer speech" are one and the same, but they are 
not. Ideas, visualizations, and internal cognitive 
paradigms are not necessarily conceived or "instantiated 
internally" in linear fashion, yet all speech, and 
consequently, all writing, must comply with the 
physiological constraint of linearity. 
Linearity accounts for much of the difficulty linguists 
have had in dealing with semantics and global coherence. 
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Traditionally, linguistics was limited to spoken language 
and to the sentence level, both of which are linear (and 
written language is even more constrained by linearity than 
is spoken language); however, semantics and global coherence 
are not limited to linearity, and trying to treat semantics 
or global coherence through linearity alone is like trying 
to define a cube using only the dimension of length without 
using the dimensions of height and width, or like trying to 
fully experience a circus while holding one's nose and 
plugging one's ears. This factor of linearity is the single 
most distinguishing characteristic between language and 
cognition. 
Fascination with language has also led linguists to 
investigate the connection between language and thought. 
One position regarding this connection is that the dynamics 
of human thought are universal for all humans the world 
over, yet much of the linguistic aspect of human 
communications is not universal, but instead, particular for 
a specific language. 
If one follows the line of thinking represented by the 
speculative grammarians of the 1200s, by the Port Royal 
grammarians of the 1600s, and by the "cartesian linguists" 
of today, one can posit the following key tenets: 
1) underlying all languages, i.e., underlying 
language as sui generis, is a set of cognitive 
universals which in humans are "hard-wired," i. 
e., physiologically determined; these cognitive 
universals may be logically prior to linguistic 
universals (this position is articulated in 
chapter three) 
2) because linguistic complexity above the 
level of the sign develops pari passu with 
cognitive complexity, linguistic universals have 
much in common with cognitive universals; thus, 
these sui generis features of language are best 
studied from the cognitive perspective of global 
coherence, not the linguistic perspective 
3) differences in languages are principally 
surface differences, and these differences 
manifest themselves in particular grammatical 
features of particular languages; in this study, 
such features are called sui species features and 
are best studied from the linguistic perspective 
of global coherence; hence, the term linguistic 
refers to these sui species features. 
When one distinguishes cognitive universals and 
linguistic particulars, one sees that language as sui 
generis is a symbol system which functions in key ways to 
enable humans to form coherent views of that which is real 
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in their past and present, and of that which may be possible 
in their future--indeed, this symbol system enables 
higher-order thinking itself. This symbol system which 
comprises language as sui generis performs several 
functions, the foremost of which is reference, for it is 
through the symbolic function of reference that humans can 
"establish the temporal and logical priority of empirical 
reference as the original bond between external fact and 
conceptual thought"; all other uses of language derive from 
and depend on this "fundamental semantic link" (Waldron 
xix) . 
The distinction between cognitive universals and 
linguistic particulars also allows one to note that the 
39 
systematicity of language as a sui species enables humans to 
categorize linguistic operations peculiar to a particular 
language, whether the operations are primarily inflections 
in a language such as Russian, or primarily syntactic in a 
language such as English. The systematicity of English, an 
analytic language, allows one to identify structural 
operations which enable cohesive ties at various levels in a 
composition: between juxtaposed clauses, across 
non-juxtaposed clauses, between juxtaposed paragraphs, and 
across non-juxtaposed paragraphs. Such cohering structural 
operations in English include substitution, ellipsis, and 
co-reference. 
An approach based on the distinction between cognitive 
universals and linguistic particulars not only reflects 
psychological research indicating cell specialization in the 
cerebral cortex, but for the teacher of composition, this 
distinction, in combination with the notion of contextually 
salient features, also re-distributes the burden of 
communication from what has been the sole traditional 
carrier, the surface language of the text, to the three 
global factors represented by the linguistic, cognitive, and 
contextually salient perspectives. Significantly, this 
approach also concerns itself with the feature of linearity, 
for the linguistic perspective is the only perspective 
operating under this constraint, and since it is the most 
explicit perspective and, indeed, the one through which the 
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other two perspectives are related, the composition teacher 
must be particularly mindful of linearity. Consequently, he 
or she must also pay especial attention to directionality 
and how it relates to the nucleus of natural-language logic, 
a nucleus consisting of reference and logical identity; 
these concepts are discussed in the context of Halliday and 
Hasan's work on cohesion. 
What follows is a survey of three major works which 
treat elements of global coherence from a linguistic 
perspective: M. A. K. Halliday and Ruquaiya Hasan's Cohesion 
in English, Waldemar Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts, 
and Robin Markels' A New Perspective in Cohesion in 
Expository Paragraphs. The survey ends with the 
identification of elements of global coherence from the 
linguistic perspective and their placement along an 
explicit-implicit continuum. 
Halliday and Hasan 
Halliday and Hasan's Cohesion in English is the single 
most cited work on the topic of cohesion. Scholars such as 
Waldemar Gutwinski even regard Halliday and Hasan's 
treatment of cohesion as the ultimate position on textual 
cohesion, but this position may well be like that of such 
linguists as Leonard Bloomfield, Charles Fries, and other 
structuralists who believed the study of language had 
reached its zenith in the late 1950s when methods of 
linguistic analysis enabled the "complete description of all 
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linguistic analysis enabled the "complete description of all 
human languages." Studies in neuro-, psycho-, and 
sociolinguistics now indicate the fallacy of this position. 
Nonetheless, Halliday and Hasan's treatment of cohesion in 
English merits attention, for it deals intricately with the 
most explicit and most frequently used elements of global 
coherence. 
Halliday and Hasan's method of textual analysis, is, in 
their words, a "way to offer an insight into what it is that 
makes a text a text" (328), and to do so they place cohesion 
within a "description of English," with the sentence as the 
"highest structural unit in their grammar" (28). Linguistic 
structures are limited to four "ranks": clause, verbal 
group, nominal group, and adverbial group. Despite these 
limits, however, Halliday and Hasan investigate the 
"linguistic means whereby a text is enabled to function as a 
single meaningful unit" (29-30). Further, a "text" exhibits 
"texture" when it "functions as a unity with respect to its 
environments" (2). According to Halliday and Hasan, 
texture, or global coherence, 
is achieved through the mutually complementary relationship 
of "register" and "cohesion" (23). 
Register is "the set of meanings, the configuration of 
semantic patterns, that are typically drawn upon under the 
specified conditions, along with the words and structures 
that are used in the realization of the meanings" (23). 
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Two distinctions need to be made at this point, one 
concerning Halliday and Hasan's meaning of the word 
reference, the other concerning their dichotomy between the 
structural and the non-structural. Reference and logical 
identity form the nucleus of natural-language logic. 
Reference is the most fundamental property of language, the 
simple but absolutely essential characteristic enabling the 
link between linguistic symbol and the thing referred to. 
However, this fundamental meaning of reference is not what 
is meant by Halliday and Hasan. Rather, they use the word 
reference to mean co-reference, i.e., two or more words 
having the same referent. In this study, the word reference 
carries its fundamental meaning, and the word co-reference 
is used wherever Halliday and Hasan have used the word 
reference. 
The distinction between "structural" and 
"non-structural" cohesion is crucial. For Halliday and 
Hasan, cohesion is a process in which the relation between 
two items in a text is enabled, and thus the sub-divisions 
of cohesion--reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, 
and lexical cohesion--are also relational, and hence, 
"non-structural," as opposed to "structural." However, one 
might argue that Halliday and Hasan operate from a 
perspective which splits form and meaning by positing this 
kind of structural/non-structural distinction. The 
structural category of the semantic system, according to 
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Halliday and Hasan, consists of the following components: 
clause group (theme), verbal group (voice), nominal group 
(deixis), adverbial group (conjunction), and information 
unit (information distribution or focus); the non-structural 
category consists solely of cohesion (reference, 
substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion). 
However, these five sub-categories of cohesion are 
structural in nature because co-reference is a form of 
substitution, as is ellipsis. Indeed, Wolfgang Dressler 
argues that "conditions triggering explicit and elliptic 
anaphoric transformations ... are often similar," so 
similar that he posits, citing various scholars (Lakoff, 
Green, Dougherty, and Steinitz) a universal condition for 
both explicit and implicit (elliptical) anaphoric 
transformations: "recoverability or possibility of 
substitution," and that this is "true for deletion and 
anaphoric pronouns such as 'he, she, it' or pseudo-
pronominal nouns" (205). 
Further, as one will see in chapter three, conjunction 
is inextricably bound to structure, for it is the role of 
conjunctions to indicate not only the basic temporal-spatial 
relationships of thought, but also the complex logical 
structures of the central cognitive processes. 
Lastly, lexical cohesion is, as Halliday and Hasan 
maintain, non-structural in the sense that the ties enabling 
lexical cohesion are "associative" in nature (De Saussure 
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123, 125-27); these associational ties relate to semantic 
domains, which are integral to the cognitive and 
contextually salient perspectives of global coherence 
addressed later in this study. Lexical cohesion is, 
however, structural in the sense that the meanings 
represented by the vocabulary of any semantic domain are wed 
to forms which, although arbitrary as Ferdinand de Saussure 
noted, are forms nonetheless. 
Thus, the structural vs. non-structural dichotomy is an 
unneeded dichotomy and is founded on the flawed assumption 
that form (structure) can be separated from meaning. Form 
and meaning can no more be separated than can language from 
the development of higher-order thought; the relationship of 
each pair is pari passu. Halliday and Hasan make a valuable 
contribution to the linguistic perspective of global 
coherence by their delineation and examination of such 
cohering operations as co-reference, substitution, ellipsis, 
conjunction, and lexical cohesion; this study, however, 
argues that co-reference and ellipsis are forms of 
substitution, and that substitution is structural in nature, 
being achieved through structural operations in English as 
shown by transformational-generative grammar, and that these 
structural operations enable cohesive ties which, with few 
exceptions, are explicitly represented in the surface 
language of a text by overt markers. (Detailed support of 
this argument, which refutes Halliday and Hasan's position 
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that co-reference, substitution, and ellipsis are 
non-structural, is found in Appendix I of this study.) 
Whether co-reference, ellipsis, and sUbstitution are 
structural or non-structural, correct sUbstitution is 
essential not only for the sake of variety, but more 
importantly for logical identity, which, along with symbolic 
reference, constitutes the nucleus of natural language 
logic. This nucleus is encompassed by the linguistic, 
cognitive, and contextually salient perspectives as the 
visual metaphor in chapter five illustrates. 
Moreover, it is argued that conjunction is better 
examined in the cognitive perspective of global coherence 
because it is indicative of underlying, basic, and complex 
cognitive processes. Lastly, it is argued that lexical 
cohesion subdivides into two categories, natural and 
synthetic semantic domains, with natural domains better 
examined from the cognitive perspective because they are 
products of evolved cognitive processes, and synthetic 
domains better examined from the contextually salient 
perspective because they are determined by cultural forces. 
In sum, though Halliday and Hasan nominally reject any 
extra-textual considerations of global coherence, their 
focus on such sui species features of a text's surface 
language as co-reference, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis 
is apropos this investigation of the linguistic perspective 
of global coherence. Moreover, Cohesion in English offers 
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valuable insight into how structural operations, especially 
those involving sUbstitution of pro-forms or the zero 
element, comprise the lion's share of the cohesive elements 
in the linguistic perspective of global coherence. 
Gutwinski 
Waldemar Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts, 
published in the same year as Halliday and Hasan's Cohesion 
in English and drawing from Halliday and Hasan's earlier 
publications (Halliday 1962, 1964, 1972; Hasan 1964, 1967, 
1968), posits a theoretical framework quite similar to that 
of Halliday and Hasan in terms of cohesive elements. As the 
title indicates, Gutwinski focuses on works in belles 
lettres, and he analyzes passages by Ernest Hemingway and 
Henry James. 
One should note at the outset that although Gutwinski 
touches on research concerning coherence, he believes 
coherence to be unanalyzable in the linguistic sense because 
it deals with phenomena which "cannot be treated on a single 
level of analysis and some of which are not open to 
linguistic analysis at all" (26). These latter "phenomena" 
are things such as "gaps in thought," which Gutwinski 
illustrates with a brief passage from a freshman composition 
text, Writing with a Purpose, in which the author, James 
Mccrimmon, advises student writers to avoid "gaps in 
thought" if they wish to write a coherent paragraph. Thus, 
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Gutwinski tells us, the term coherence is "carefully 
avoided" in his study (27). 
Gutwinski states that none of the "several competing 
theories of language organization [the extended standard 
theory of generative transformational grammar, generative 
semantics, applicational-generative, tagmemic, systemic, and 
stratificational grammar] ... " have "developed a semology 
or fully-worked out tactics for its upper stratum (lexical 
hierarchy or lexis)" which "must be seen as an inadequacy if 
any explicitness is attempted" (23). This view 
notwithstanding, Gutwinski uses stratificational theory as 
his theoretical base because "it recognizes and develops 
several strata, one of which is semology" (25); this 
semology is defined as a system "behind" grammar that 
consists of 
meaning contrasts and patterns of sense 
organization ... [which are] still very 
poorly understood. Yet we suspect that the 
relationship of semology to grammar is much the 
same as that of grammar to phonology. 
(Gleason qtd. in Gutwinski 39) 
Gutwinski relates that most of the linguistic phenomena in 
his study belong to the "grammatic stratum" (sic) of 
stratificational grammar (25). He thus proceeds to examine 
"the cohesive relations obtaining between clauses and 
sentences in some selected literary prose texts," that is, 
passages from James and Hemingway (26). 
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Several "cohesive categories" are offered by Gutwinski 
(54), the foremost of which is "the method of order" of 
sentences (55). He states: 
The order in which clauses and sentences follow in 
a text is, then, a cohesive factor which is always 
present in the text and which in combination with 
other cohesive factors--and sometimes even 
alone--indicates what kind of cohesive relations 
obtain among the sentence and clauses. . . • it 
[order] will underlie implicitly correlations 
involving all other cohesive factors studied here. 
(Gutwinski 56) 
Unfortunately, Gutwinski develops nothing further 
vis-a-vis order and these "implicit correlations." Instead, 
he focuses on much the same sort of cohesive relations that 
Halliday and Hasan do. Gutwinski divides cohesive features 
into two categories, grammatical and lexical. The 
grammatical category consists of anaphora/cataphora, 
coordination/subordination, and enation/agnation; the 
lexical category consists of repetition, occurrence of a 
synonym or item "formed on same root," and occurrence of an 
"item from same lexical set (co-occurrence group)" (57). 
Gutwinski, drawing from Gleason, enlarges the "phoric" 
category to include not only anaphora and cataphora, but 
also homophora (reference to general or cultural knowledge, 
e.g., "the army," "the queen," "the Superbowl"), exophora 
(reference to "a situation outside of language," e.g., using 
a gesture to supplement one's communication), and paraphora 
(reference to something in another text, e.g., a line from 
Shakespeare) (66-68); however, Gutwinski's approach does not 
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admit any reference other than anaphora or cataphora, 
presumably for the same reasons he avoids all use of the 
word coherence: such aspects, in his approach, are 
non-linguistic. Although Gutwinski admits only anaphora and 
cataphora for his approach to cohesion, one can relate all 
five kinds of "phoric" reference to the notion of linearity, 
the significant constraint under which the linguistic 
perspective must operate, but which the cognitive and 
contextually salient perspectives are free of. 
Both Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan give considerable 
attention to anaphora and cataphora, with Gutwinski arguing 
(60-61) that anaphora has traditionally received the most 
attention of all cohesive features, with that attention 
initially focused within clauses (Bloomfield), but that 
later scholars have broadened the scope to include 
inter-clausal cohesion (Gleason; Halliday & Hasan; Quirk, 
Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik). One might add that both 
anaphora and cataphora adhere to the constraint of linearity 
and are distinguished one from the other primarily in terms 
of directionality. Paraphora, too, is constrained by 
linearity, but it is the linearity of another text, and thus 
it is disallowed per Gutwinski's criteria. One might argue 
that paraphora is a type of homophora. One can also note 
that much of these two fundamental kinds of reference is not 
constrained by linearity, and that they are within the 
bounds of the contextually salient perspective of global 
coherence. 
Again drawing from Gleason, Gutwinski illustrates 
enation and agnation as grammatical features. Enation, a 
form of grammatical parallelism, is illustrated by the 
following nursery rhyme: 
[2:71] This little pig went to market 
This little pig stayed home 
This little pig had roast beef 
This little pig had none. . .. (76) 
Agnation is "used for relations that are opposite and 
complementary to enation" (78). The following sentences 
illustrate agnation: 
[2:72] There was nothing left for her but to sell the 
old family house. This she couldn't do. 
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This she couldn't do is an agnate structure which serves to 
cohere the two sentences by reversing the SVo word order of 
sell the old house. However, one might also argue that 
This, in conjunction with do, are sUbstitutes for sell the 
old family house, and that This has been fronted through a 
structural operation akin to the do-fronting transformation 
in transformational-generative grammar, and that the 
variation in word order is not as much for purposes of 
cohesion as for stylistic emphasis. One other example of 
agnation is the following: 
[2:73] James wrote this book. 
This book was written by James. (78) 
Here one has an example of the active-passive 
transformation. The reason for the alternation between 
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structures lies not so much in efforts to cohere a text via 
structural operations as in the given/new relationship, 
which, it will be argued in chapter three of this study, is 
a fundamental part of the cognitive perspective of global 
coherence. 
In sum, Gutwinski offers two main categories, the 
grammatical and the lexical, whose elements serve as overt 
markers of cohesive ties and which are explicitly 
represented in the surface language of a text. The 
grammatical category consists of anaphora/cataphora, 
coordination/subordination, and enation/agnation: the 
lexical category consists of repetition, occurrence of 
synonyms, and co-occurrence of items from the same lexical 
group. Yet, as was argued earlier, coordination and 
subordination might be better treated from the cognitive 
perspective because of their close relationship to central 
cognitive processes. Enation, to the extent it is cohesive 
rather than stylistic, might be better treated from the 
contextually salient perspective since parallelism is one of 
several cultural thought patterns that humans use to 
structure their thought and text (Kaplan). As stated 
earlier, agnation might be better treated from the cognitive 
perspective due to its representing the given/new 
relationship. Those cohesive ties represented by synonyms 
and items from the same lexical group might best be treated 
as part of natural or synthetic semantic domains, with the 
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former viewed from the cognitive perspective and the latter 
from the contextually salient perspective. This leaves 
repetition, anaphora, and cataphora; the latter two result 
from structural operations as demonstrated by 
transformational generative grammar, and are forms of 
sUbstitution differing primarily in directionality. 
Although Halliday and Hasan also mentioned repetition as a 
cohesive operation, they did not elaborate on it or assign 
it to a cohesive category other than to state that it is a 
type of reiteration (Halliday & Hasan 278). 
The review of Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan 
indicates that the basic cohesive categories in the 
linguistic perspective continue to emanate from the 
fundamental structural operation of sUbstitution: for 
Halliday and Hasan, the cohesive categories are 
co-reference, ellipsis, and substitution, with co-reference 
and ellipsis being types of substitution, and for Gutwinski, 
the cohesive categories are anaphora, cataphora, and 
repetition, with anaphora and cataphora kinds of 
co-reference, and therefore examples of sUbstitution. 
In addition to reinforcing the primacy of sUbstitution 
as a cohesive tie in the linguistic perspective, Gutwinski 
expands the notion of reference by drawing on Gleason's work 
on "phoric" reference. Gutwinski not only treats anaphoric 
and cataphoric reference in relation to cohesion, but he 
also treats homophoric, paraphoric, and exophoric reference. 
Although he does not admit the three as cohesive, our 
approach to global coherence, consisting of not only the 
linguistic perspective, but also the cognitive and 
contextually salient perspectives, will admit these latter 
three types of reference, and hence, they will be explored 
in the respective chapters of this study. Moreover, 
Gutwinski's treatment of the various kinds of "phoric" 
reference enables one to relate each to the notion of 
linearity, which, as was noted earlier, is a significant 
constraint for the linguistic perspective, but not for the 
cognitive nor the contextually salient perspectives. 
Markels 
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Markels' work, A New Perspective on Cohesion in 
Expository Paragraphs, offers interesting points of 
commonality and dissimilarity with respect to the works of 
Gutwinski and of Halliday and Hasan. Where Gutwinski 
focuses on works of belles lettres and Halliday and Hasan 
focus on dialog and narrative, as well as belles lettres, 
Markels focuses on expository writing; where Gutwinski is 
oriented toward the text as a whole and Halliday and Hasan 
are oriented towards texts of various lengths exhibiting 
various degrees of closure, Markels is oriented toward 
paragraphs. In addition, Markels does not offer an overall 
framework for analyzing the elements of coherence as do 
Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan. In these ways, Markels' 
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treatment of the linguistic aspect of global coherence 
differs markedly from those of Gutwinski and Halliday and 
Hasan. These significant differences notwithstanding, 
Markels finds common ground with both Gutwinski and Halliday 
and Hasan in two key areas: 1) the essential roles of 
substitution, ellipsis, and [co-]reference in cohering a 
text; and, 2) the essential and subsuming role of repetition 
in cohering a text. 
central to Markels' approach is the notion of 
recurrence; indeed, she argues that "Where a recurrence 
chain exists, there is cohesion; without a chain, [there is] 
no cohesion" (14). Although she does not cite Harris, it 
would seem that Markels' notion of a recurrence chain is 
quite similar to Harris' "equivalence chain" (6-29); 
however, Harris explores the use of the equivalence chain 
through various grammatical structures and lexical domains, 
while Markels by-and-Iarge restricts her examination of 
"recurrence chains" to the three structural operations of 
substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference, all three of which 
she states are "forms of partial repetition" (17). One 
should note, though, that although for Markels the notion of 
recurrence is central to her approach, her view of 
recurrence goes beyond the notion that it is simply 
repetition, whether it is manifested through the structural 
operations of substitution, ellipsis, or co-reference, or 
whether it is "simply" the repeated use of the same word. 
For Markels, this expanded notion of recurrence comprises 
the principal property of linguistic cohesion. Markels 
illustrates this centrality by using the following two 
examples: 
[2:74] 
The opossum has survived in definitely 
hostile surroundings for seventy million years. 
The opossum is small; it can easily find a little 
food, while big animals starve. The individual 
opossum is not very delicate; it can stand severe 
punishment. It "plays 'possum" when it gets into 
trouble. It can go without food for a long time. 
Many different things are food to an opossum. 
Traits of the opossum have a high survival value. 
The opossum is a survivor from the Age of 
Reptiles. (qtd. in Gorrell & Laird 125) 
[2:75] 
The reasons our opossum has survived in 
definitely hostile surroundings for 70 million 
years are evident. One is his small size: small 
animals always find hiding places, they always 
find a little food, where the big ones starve. 
Another of its assets was its astounding 
fecundity; if local catastrophes left only a few 
survivors, it did not take long to reestablish a 
thriving population. Also the individual opossum 
is not exactly delicate: it can stand severe 
punishment--during which it "plays 'possum" and 
then scampers away--and it can go without food for 
a considerable time. Finally, a great many things 
are "food" to an opossum. Each of these traits 
has a high survival value, and their combination 
has presented the United states with a survivor 
from the Age of Reptiles. (qtd. in Gorrell & 
Laird 126) 
In the first opossum text, the recurrence chain is 
established through simple repetition of the word opossum; 
in the second opossum text, the recurrence chain is 
established not only by the word opossum, but also through 
the structural operations of substitution, ellipsis, and 
co-reference, and such structural operations, Markels 
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argues, function in two important ways: 1) they "maintain an 
unbroken chain of recurrences and thereby establish some 
degree of cohesion through unity"; and 2) they "subordinate 
information already known or recoverable by reducing the 
autonomy of sentences containing that information and 
forcing the reader back to preceding sentences for the 
antecedents or other substitutions" (17). 
To bolster her argument that repetition is central to 
cohesion, Markels points out that in various 
psycholinguistic studies concerned with thematization 
(Perfetti & Goldman; Kintsch; Bransford & Franks; and 
Crothers), the "shared constant" was repetition, except in 
the work of Crothers, who concedes that lack of repetition 
"probably explains his negative results" (38). This, 
Markels states, confirms her hypothesis that "cohesion 
consists primarily of unity, the presence of a repeated 
term" (38). 
To demonstrate her approach, Markels analyzes two kinds 
of paragraphs, single-term and multiple-chain. Here one 
examines her analysis of a single-term paragraph, i.e., a 
paragraph whose cohesion is established through one 
recurrence chain, as opposed to a multiple-chain paragraph 
which may have a dominant recurrence chain and subordinant 
recurrence chains. 
Cohesion in the single-term paragraph occurs when "a 
term achieves semantic dominance through repetition or 
equivalence" and "appears consistently in the subject or 
dominant noun phrase position" (45), as in the "basic" 
paragraph, 
[2:76] 
The Char-Bar is a bar on High street. The 
Char-Bar swings. It permits dancing. The bar 
specializes in foreign beers. The Char-Bar 
attracts weirdos. It seats 198 people. 
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as opposed to the following set of sentences which possesses 
a semantically dominant term, but not one that appears 
consistently in the subject or dominant noun phrase 
position: 
[2:77] 
Alfred likes peaches. Oregon doesn't grow 
peaches. Peaches contain nitrogen. We have a 
peach tree in our backyard. No one throws rotten 
peaches at politicians or ball players. Cut five 
peaches and sprinkle with sugar. Do you think 
peach melba would be a good dessert? 
Referring to example [2:77], Markels states that "once the 
repeated term 'peaches' appears in the predicate position, 
it forfeits the inherently limiting power of the subject 
position and is itself 'subjected' to at least five other 
topics: Alfred, Oregon, we, no one, you." Markels continues 
by observing that "cohesion requires the meshing of both 
semantic and syntactic information and, at least for some 
paragraphs ... can be defined operationally" (44). 
At this juncture, one certainly does not want to delve 
into the sticky question concerning the exact nature of 
semantics and syntax, but one might note that structure, as 
opposed to syntax alone, occupies a prominent role in this 
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study's three-pronged approach to global coherence, and that 
structure in this study is confined neither to syntax nor to 
the linguistic perspective. Indeed, it is argued in 
chapters three and four of this study that structure forms 
an essential aspect of both the cognitive and contextually 
salient perspectives of global coherence. Having said this, 
it can be pointed out that in example [2:77], more than 
simply placing the word peach in the subject position of 
each sentence would be required to cohere the collection of 
sentences into a paragraph, as the "re-structuring" below 
indicates: 
[2:78] 
Peaches are a favorite of Alfred's. Peaches 
don't grow in Oregon. A peach tree grows in our 
backyard. Peaches are not thrown at politicians 
or ball players. Five peaches are cut and 
sprinkled with sugar. Peach melba would be a good 
dessert, don't you think? 
Although the "Char-Bar" paragraph [2:76] will never win a 
prize for style, it at least is cohesive, but even the 
moving of the word peach to the subject position can not 
salvage this poor collection of sentences. 
Markels' assertion to the contrary, it would seem that 
a cohesive paragraph subtends more than a meshing of 
semantics and syntax; it is a meshing of more than these two 
important elements, and chapters three and four will 
illuminate, at least in part, other elements which serve to 
provide a coherent text. Perhaps part of the problem in 
Markels' semantics-syntax argument lies in two of her 
premises. 
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The first premise is that English is "position 
dependent on syntactic information" (45). Markels does not 
elaborate on what she means by syntactic information, and of 
course, English is primarily an SVO language. However, as 
the wealth of sentence variety due to variation in word 
order illustrates, English is not position dependent for 
syntactic information, as examples [2:77] and [2:78] show. 
The second premise is that a transformational analysis 
can illustrate the semantics-syntax relationship by using 
the TG concept of dominant sentence node when a collection 
of sentences employs ellipsis in lieu of term repetition. 
This premise overlooks the fundamental non-semantic nature 
of TG sentence trees. As Chomsky and others have repeatedly 
shown, TG grammar was concerned with syntax, not semantics. 
Too, a non-sensical sentence tree employing elliptical 
constructions is easily generated because transformational 
grammar deals with sentence structure, not sentence sense. 
It is interesting to note that while Markels stresses 
that her approach is "[h]eavily grounded in syntactic 
analysis" (86) and places the burden of cohesion on "the 
meshing of both semantic and syntactic information" (44), 
thus confining the role of structure to syntactic structure, 
she seems to anticipate cognitive and contextually salient 
elements of global coherence, for she states that "[o]nly 
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the concept of an a priori frame" composed of a world view 
between the communicants can "explain language use" (33), 
citing research which supports this view (Minsky; Schank & 
Abelson; Rommetveit). Such a reference to a priori frames 
suggests the kind of "hard-wired" central cognitive 
processes to be explored in chapter three of this study, and 
the notion of world views, and concomitantly, extra-textual 
elements, suggests the concepts of central metaphors and 
epistemological frames which are treated in chapter four of 
this study. Likewise, Markels seems to anticipate 
contextually salient elements of global coherence when she 
reflects on the role sUbjective interpretation plays 
whenever a person engages with a text. She quotes Stephen 
Tyler in his The Said and the Unsaid: Mind, Meaning, and 
culture: 
the "objective and universal character . . . 
[of a text and its textuality] . . . can be 
realized only through the sUbjectivity of some 
reader, thus the burden of interpretation." (378) 
In sum, Markels does not offer an overall framework 
which subsumes categories and elements of cohesion as do the 
authors of the other two major works on cohesion, Gutwinski 
and Halliday and Hasan; too, Markels' focus is primarily on 
paragraphs, not on texts comprised of paragraphs. One might 
also disagree with her premises concerning the role of 
syntax vis-a-vis cohesion in paragraphs. Finally, Markels 
does not explore the nature and various manifestations of 
"phoric" reference as do Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan. 
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Markels does, however, reiterate four aspects of cohesion 
that both Gutwinski and Halliday and Hasan find central to 
coherence: repetition, and the structural operations of 
substitution, ellipsis, and co-reference. Finally, one may 
observe that she, unlike Gutwinksi and Halliday and Hasan, 
seems to allow for non-linguistic, i.e., non-textual, 
elements in the global coherence of a text. 
Linguistic Elements of Global Coherence 
As noted earlier, the linguistic perspective deals with 
those elements of global coherence manifested the most 
frequently and often the most explicitly in a text; such 
elements are manifested through and by a text's own language 
in words meant to be understood at the literal level. As a 
review of Cohesion in English, Cohesion in Literary Texts, 
and A New Perspective on Cohesion in Expository Paragraphs 
indicates, these elements are indeed text-bound, and 
therefore significantly constrained by linearity, hence the 
emphases on anaphora, ellipsis, repetition, and cataphora by 
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels. Our review of 
the above-mentioned works also reveals that an additional 
constraint operates in the linguistic perspective: the 
constraint of co-reference. Thus, one can make the 
generalization that linguistic elements of global coherence 
are meant to be understood at the literal level of language 
and are constrained by the properties of linearity and 
co-reference. 
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When one determines to form a cohesive tie, whether 
immediate, mediated, or remote (cf. Appendix I), one must 
choose whether the tie will be explicit or have a 
significant degree of implicitness. If one chooses an 
explicit tie, three options result: repetition of the 
referent, an anaphoric pro-form co-referential with the 
referent, or a cataphoric pro-form co-referential with the 
referent. If one chooses a tie with a significant degree of 
implicitness, only one option exists: ellipsis, which, 
though almost always anaphoric, is largely implicit in 
nature because of its "zero component." 
Thus, linguistic elements of global coherence are 
represented by four categories: repetition, ellipsis, 
anaphora, and cataphora. Of these four categories, the 
latter three are effected in the surface structure of a text 
through structural operations of the sort illustrated by 
transformational- generative grammar. The remaining 
category, repetition, is effected through duplication of the 
referent. The elements of repetition, i.e., the words used 
to effect repetition, constitute an open set since it 
consists of repetition of the referent, and the referent may 
be represented by any number of constructions or word 
classes. The elements of ellipsis also constitute an open 
set since its surface manifestations may be represented by 
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any number of constructions and word classes. The elements 
of anaphora and the elements of cataphora constitute closed 
sets, those of pro-forms, as indicated in the following 
handlist. 
Handlist of Linguistic Elements of Global Coherence 
Repetition (open set) 
duplication of the referent itself 
Ellipsis (open set) 
sUbstitution by the zero element of a portion of a parallel 
and recoverable form 
Anaphora (closed set) 
above 
The source for the above figures for the deficit is the 
Congressional Office of the Budget. 
aforementioned 
The aforementioned plat is erroneous in both scale and 
orientation. 
the said 




The aforesaid is not the man we are after. 
The Versailles Treaty is much too severe, and here the 
Allied Powers err tragically. 








I opened the door casually; it was then that I realized 
the room was decorated and all my friends were waiting 
for me. 
The hardliners underestimated Mr. Gorbachev, and this 
was a mistake. 
The student had split an infinitive and ended a 
sentence with a preposition. The infuriated 
teacher shouted "These are the kinds of errors 
which I will not tolerate!" 
As the young woman accepted the bouquet of flowers, she 
smiled and said "That was a gracious gesture on your 
part." 
"Give me Socrates, Plato, and Zorba! Those are the 
Greeks I am most interested in!" 
the foregoing 
No matter how you argue, the foregoing will need to be 
notarized. 
the preceding 
The preceding was unnecessary propaganda. Everyone is 
already convinced. 
the former/the latter 
Sonny Liston and Muhammad Ali were two heavyweight 
champions of the world. The former was an ex-con, 
and the latter was an extra-good con. 
the earlier 
The cinema has two matinees on Sundays. The earlier 
has seats for only one dollar. 
the 
A young man stood alone at the highest point of the 
bridge. The young man was Stephen Daedelus. 
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the first (second, third, . . . ) 
The first was the best. 
the last 
The last actually scored better because of the softened 
playing field. 
so + adjective/adverb 
The theater was absolutely crowded. I did not expect 
so many people at this performance. 
that + adjective/adverb 
Rueckert broke the four-minute mark! I had no idea he 
ran that fast! 






I love purple. It is such a royal color. 
Both students studied hard, but only one passed the 
exam. 
Yes, I know there are all sorts of onions, but only the 
ones from Valdalia are sweet enough to eat like an 
apple. 
John is a solid fellow; he is always honest and 
considerate. 
I liked George very much, but I could never understand 
him. 









My first Spanish teacher will always by my favorite, 
for she is the one I married. 
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Sally dances wonderfully; I could have danced all night 
with her. 
Let me see Cecilia's paintings; hers are always worth 
buying. 
Approving the budget will be difficult, but it is 
vital. 
Examine the dog's left-rear paw; its webbing has been 
torn. 
Mssrs. Reagan and Bush were both traditional 
Republicans in that they relied heavily on defense 
spending. 
Your sister and your brother will be here for only two 
more weeks. We must do our best to entertain them. 




I have eaten my hamburger, but Sam and Dave have not; 
theirs is on the stove. 








The first superchip was manufactured in Silicon Valley, 
but an identical one was soon manufactured in Hamburg. 
Joanna hopes to be home for Christmas. I hope so, too. 
Democrats want the economy to improve; Republicans and 
independents do, too. 
Jonathan doesn't care how long it takes him to secure 
a good position. He just wants to do it. 
You want me to examine the tires, the carburetor, and 
the brakes, and I will do so, but please let me eat 
lunch first. 
do that 
The police officer asked me to get into his cruiser, 
but I refused to do that. 




Lyndon Johnson achieved a measure of domestic success, 
and it is clear that Bill Clinton wants do the same. 
We will be visiting Africa in 1999 for the entire 
summer, and Mark and Carol also will be. 
Paco Sinmiedo will find his name in The Guinness Book 
of Records, be it next year or the following one. 
Mother seems always to be tired, irritable, and sleepy. 
I don't want her to be so. 
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be that 
She proposes to continue college after the birth of her 




Lafayette was given honorary citizenship, and likewise, 
Churchill. 
He says that to juggle the accounts to achieve his 
promotion is the surest and quickest way to advance in 
the firm, but it is not. 
I ran seven miles the day I decided to begin my diet, 
which was not the prudent thing to do. 







The Pruss ian drill instructor yelled "You will do 
thusly!" Then, he demonstrated an about-face, followed 
by the clicking of his heels. 
"It is thus," intoned the piano teacher, after which 
his long, slender fingers nimbly scaled the notes. 
Here is where you are wrong. Inflation will not soar 
out of control as long as the Federal Reserve maintains 
tight control of the money supply. 
It is wonderful to be independent. 
This is what will happen next. The lioness will 
actually purr her way out of the fix she is in! 
These are the latest photographs of Mars. 
as follows 
The criteria are as follows: six foot minimum height, 
six foot minimum depth, and four foot minimum width. 
the following 
below 
The successful definition must include the 
following:the placing of the term within a class; the 
distinguishing of the term from other items in the 
class; an example illustrating the term. 
Below, you will find the necessary instructions for 
complete assembly of the rocking horse. 
An Explicit-Implicit Continuum 
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As noted in the overview of the linguistic perspective, 
a language is a marvelously complex and prolific system of 
symbols. This symbol system is so rich and so variegated 
that it complements the richness and variegation of the 
human mind in a pari passu relationship, thus enabling 
humans to achieve levels of thought higher than possible at 
the level of sign. 
The richness and variegation of this symbol system is 
evident when one considers that in English 26 letters form 
approximately 1,000,000 words, and of these 1,000,000 words, 
one can form an infinite number of sentences. It is this 
unlimited combinatorial nature that one must wrestle with 
and express oneself through as one attempts to make sense of 
one's surroundings and life. Fortunately, this burgeoning 
infinity of language is made manageable through the logic of 
natural language. At the very nucleus of this logic are the 
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semantically primal qualities of symbolic reference and 
logical identity. Symbolic reference enables the symbol to 
re-present for the language user the referent, and, as 
Waldron demonstrates, is not a mundane affair, but one 
having significant cognitive implications which chapter 
three will relate to the cognitive elements of global 
coherence. 
Symbolic reference is distinguished by polysemy, yet 
this very characteristic, which elevates sign to symbol, 
thereby affording to it greater utility, also affords to it 
greater potential for ambiguity or confusion. This 
liability is offset, however, by the second nuclear quality 
of natural language logic, logical identity, for logical 
identity not only helps one winnow the several meanings a 
term may have, but it also enables one to view the item with 
a consistent meaning throughout a text, and it is here that 
the significance of the linguistic elements of global 
coherence becomes evident. 
If one compares the very small number of anaphoric and 
cataphoric elements to the million-plus words available in 
the English language, and, as will be done in chapters three 
and four, if one compares the essentially explicit nature of 
these linguistic elements to the relatively implicit nature 
of the cognitive and contextually salient elements of global 
coherence, one may rightly be intrigued by their prominence 
in the overall schema of global coherence; upon analysis, 
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one finds that their small number is offset by their high 
frequency of usage. Further, one finds that their word 
class, their relatively small number and high frequency, and 
their mandatory explicitness enable logical identity. 
If one holds that symbolic reference is rooted in, but 
not restricted to, empirical experience, if one follows 
Wolfgang Dressler and others who posit that semantic deep 
structure consists solely of noun phrases, and further, that 
the overwhelming use of symbolic reference is not empirical 
reference, i.e., referring exclusively to the empirical 
here-and-now, but instead, that most language use is modal 
reference, i.e., referring to all situations and 
circumstances not in the empirical here-and-now (Waldron), 
one can see that the properties of word class, relatively 
small number and high frequency, and mandatory explicitness 
enable the linguistic elements of global coherence to serve 
an essential role in the cohering of discourse. The 
dominant word class for the linguistic elements of global 
coherence is that of pro-forms or their derivatives, even in 
elliptical constructions (e.g., the possessive pronouns his 
and hers). These pro-forms are either full or truncated 
noun phrases and represent surface manifestations quite 
similar to the corresponding noun phrase in semantic deep 
structure. The small number and high frequency of the 
linguistic elements of global coherence ease memory load, 
increase clarity (when used consistently and with a definite 
73 
antecedent), and further reinforce the noun phrase/semantic 
deep structure property. 
The mandatory explicitness of the linguistic elements 
of global coherence links in a basic way the roots of 
symbolic reference and empirical reference, the latter of 
which is explicit by nature. To be sure, pro-forms are used 
for modal reference as well as for empirical reference, but 
even when pro-forms are used for modal reference, the 
condition of mandatory explicitness applies, just as the 
early users of language had to explicitly re-present their 
empirically-rooted experience. That is, the early users of 
language initially used language to refer to the 
here-and-the-now, and from this "symbolic base," they then 
developed modal reference. One may even go so far as to 
speculate that the explicit nature of the linguistic 
elements of global coherence is, in the evolutionary sense, 
a remnant of the explicit nature that all early symbolic 
reference required. Whether or not this speculation will be 
proven, one can, through analyses of texts such as those by 
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels, attest to the 
predominantly explicit nature of the linguistic elements of 
global coherence, as the continuum below demonstrates. 







Because of the mandatory explicitness of the linguistic 
elements of global coherence, all four categories--
repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis--are located 
at the explicit end of the continuum, but because ellipsis 
has an implicit component, it is also located at the 
implicit end of the continuum. This continuum will be 
revised and expanded as chapters three and four explore the 
explicit and implicit nature of the cohering elements 
treated in the cognitive and contextually salient 
perspectives of global coherence. 
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CHAPTERll 
THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The absence of works treating global coherence from a 
cognitive perspective precludes a review of works such as 
that in chapter two, where the linguistic perspective of 
global coherence was investigated through the works of 
Halliday and Hasan, Gutwinski, and Markels. Instead, the 
cognitive perspective will be approached through the 
umbrella concept of the given/new relationship, through 
Gestalt psychology, and through central cognitive processes, 
with the intention of identifying elements of the cognitive 
perspective of global coherence and locating these elements 
on an explicit-implicit continuum. 
Overview of the Cognitive Perspective 
The word cognition derives from co + gnoscere (Latin) 
and gignoskein (Greek), meaning to come to know (161). 
Helpful in the understanding of cognition is the derivation 
of the related term, cognate: co + gnatus· (Latin), to be 
born; akin to gignere (Latin), to beget (161). One 
additional term will be helpful in understanding what is 
meant by the cognitive perspective: cognizance, which means 
range of apprehension, of becoming aware (161). Thus, when 
one speaks of cognition, one is speaking of purposeful 
mental activity, and it is precisely this kind of purposeful 
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mental activity a composition teacher seeks to nurture in 
his or her students as they wrestle with and generate their 
writing. 
In a descriptive sense, cognition may be thought of as 
unconscious, intuitive, or conscious. 
Examples of unconscious cognition are the biochemical 
threshold and the subconscious. The biochemical threshold 
deals with the firing of neurons and of the interaction of 
receptors and synapses, among other neuro-anatomical 
features. The subconscious deals with aspects such as the 
id, dreams, repressed thoughts, and pre-intuition. 
Intuitive cognition is cognition neither conscious nor 
unconscious but drawing from and dwelling in both states 
until the intuition's realization or fruition. It is the 
"Eureka!" experience which continues to fascinate cognitive 
scientists and composition teachers alike. 
Intuitive cognition may fascinate composition teachers, 
but it is conscious cognition that teachers of composition 
are primarily concerned with. Conscious cognition may be 
subdivided into unattending and attending cognition. 
unattending cognition is cognition in relation to learned 
behavior which has become virtually automatic. Examples of 
this are cognition accompanying ordinary speech, the act of 
checking for traffic before crossing a street, or the 
habitual setting of an alarm clock. 
80 
Attending cognition is cognition that is directed and 
aware, consciously purposeful (cf. cognizance). Attending 
cognition may be subdivided in the following manner: 1) a 
normally unattending cognition made attending due to unusual 
circumstances: 2) metaprocesses; 3) cogitation. Examples of 
normally unattending cognition made attending due to unusual 
circumstances are cognition accompanying the deliberate 
articulation of an utterance, the crossing of a street with 
a child for the first several times, or the setting of an 
alarm at 4:00 a.m. to view Halley's comet. Examples of 
metaprocesses are thinking about thinking, talking about 
talking, and so forth. Cogitation, the third subdivision of 
attending cognition, is the conscious, purposeful use of 
functional cognitive systems qua functional cognitive 
systems. Examples are formal problem solving, the composing 
of discourse (purposeful use of a symbol system), or a 
16-year-old's arguing for the purchase of his own car. It 
is this kind of cognition that humans engage in when they 
consciously and purposefully use functional cognitive 
systems qua functional cognitive systems, whether these 
systems are a symbol system in the form of written language 
or the central cognitive processes discussed below. 
Although the principal focus of the cognitive 
perspective on global coherence will be central cognitive 
processes as cohering elements within a cognitive system, 
two global properties must first be considered, for they to 
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varying degrees subtend all central cognitive processes as 
well as the linguistic elements of global coherence. Those 
two properties are the given/new relationship and Gestalt. 
The Given/New Relationship 
Regardless of one's epistemological foundations or 
leanings, whether one is an Objectivist, a Cartesian, a 
Kantian, or whether one hews to the Occident, to the Orient, 
or attempts a synthesis somewhere in between, the given/new 
relationship is fundamental. without the given/new 
relationship, one has no point of orientation (de Beaugrande 
184-85): one can only flounder endlessly with no hope of 
making sense of one's thoughts, one's environment, or one's 
place in it. A human by nature reasons from given to new. 
The given is one's "old" information, that which one has 
already been introduced to or stored, and, along with the 
"new," is fundamentally embedded in epistemological and 
logical frameworks such as Toulmin's data/warrant/claim, 
Piaget's assimilation/accomodation, Kuhn's normal 
science/crisis/revolutionary science, and Hegel's 
thesis/antithesis/synthesis. Not only does the given orient 
a person, but it also serves as one's point of departure for 
cognitive operations, whether the operation is the 
predication of a sentence, the completion of a hierarchy of 
categories, or the formation of the categories themselves. 
In the prior chapter, four categories of elements in 
the linguistic perspective of global coherence were 
delineated: repetition, anaphora, ellipsis, and cataphora. 
All four are subject to the given/new relationship. 
82 
Repetition, the duplication of the referent itself, is 
re-iteration of the given. 
[3:1] (G) (N) (G) (N) (G) (N) 
He will go home; he will eat; he will sleep. 
Cataphora is the reversal of the usual direction of 
reference: it refers forward from pro-form to referent. 
[3:2] (N) (N) (G) 
This is what you need to do. 
home. 
(G) (N) 
You need to go 
Anaphora represents the normal direction of reference 
in English, backward from the pro-form to the referent. 
[3: 3 ] (G) (N) (G) (N) 
John is a good swimmer. He swims three miles 
daily. 
Ellipsis is rarely cataphoric and almost always 
anaphoric; thus, it, too, is a referring backward from the 
zero element to the referent, enabled through parallel 
structure: 
[3:4] (G) (N) [G] (N) [G] (N) 
I want to go home, [zero] eat, and [zero] sleep. 
What is noteworthy is that the linguistic elements of global 
coherence always represent the given in any particular 
given/new relationship. This specific property of the 
linguistic elements helps to explain their mandatory 
explicitness and their high frequency of occurence in a 
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text. Moreover, this relationship to the given illustrates 
the bond between the relatively few linguistic elements in a 
text and their maintenance of logical identity in the text. 
The linguistic elements, by representing the given in a 
text, ensure a consistent point of reference, thus 
satisfying what is perhaps the first requisite of coherence. 
Not only is the given/new relationship prevalent in the 
linguistic perspective of global coherence as evinced in the 
above examples, but it is also prevalent in the cognitive 
perspective as the discussion of central cognitive processes 
will show. 
Gestalt 
The second global property to be considered in the 
cognitive perspective is Gestalt. As observed in chapter 
one, humans naturally assume things to "make sense"; "making 
sense" is the "unmarked" condition or quality of language 
processing. Coherence is part-and-parcel of normal speech; 
humans do not communicate not to be understood, but rather 
to be understood and to understand. This observation is as 
true of written communication as it is of spoken 
communication; however, the propensity towards coherence in 
written communication, especially in extended discourse such 
as an essay, is offset by its inherent complexities. Yet 
these inherent complexities can themselves be offset, at 
least partly, if one is aware of natural and powerful 
tendencies in humans which have been studied by Gestalt 
psychologists. 
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Gestalt psychologists believe that "organization is 
basic to all mental activity, that it is unlearned, and that 
it reflects the way the brain functions" (Gleitman 228). 
Gestalt may be defined as an "organized whole," a notion 
clearly akin to the views Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus, 
as well as contemporary teachers of composition, share 
regarding the nature of the successful piece of rhetoric. 
In addition to its focus on the organized whole, Gestalt 
psychology offers the following concepts which relate 
closely to the composing process composition teachers 
emphasize in the classroom: good continuation, closure, and 
restructuring. 
Good continuation is "a powerful organizational factor 
which will often prevail even when pitted against prior 
experience" (Gleitman 228-29). An example from nature is 
the tendency of an observer to view the twigs and branches 
of a bush as continuations of one another, despite the 
presence of a praying mantis lodged among the twigs and 
branches. The observer naturally seeks to view the twigs 
and branches as continuous parts of the whole bush and quite 
easily "blends" the slightly discontinuous body of the 
praying mantis into the body of the bush. Likewise, the 
composition student, once having completed an outline or 
rough draft of an essay, will also tend to see a continuity 
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among the various parts of the whole outline or rough draft. 
Such a tendency can impel the writer to write the outline or 
the draft despite not yet having all the details at his or 
her disposal, for the writer "sees" enough of the "twigs or 
branches" of "the bush" to generate continuity, and 
ultimately, global coherence, for the piece of writing. Or, 
in other words, good continuation often enables the writer 
to, as Donald Murray puts it, "glimpse the potential text" 
(60). Of course, this tendency is two-edged: the student 
may "see" the continuity when others may not, often due to 
the outline or rough draft being too "writer-based" and not 
sufficiently "reader-based" (Flower 19-37). 
A second contribution from Gestalt psychology regarding 
global coherence is the principle of closure, defined as the 
tendency "to complete figures that have gaps in them" 
(Gleitman 229). If one sees only a portion of a circle 
covered by a card, one will believe that the unseen portion, 
covered by the card, completes the seen portion, thus making 
a complete circle. Likewise, when one sees an unfinished 
sentence or a fill-in-the-blank sentence, one has a tendency 
to finish the sentence or fill in the blanks. Partly 
filled-in crossword puzzles also draw on this cognitive 
tendency toward closure, as does a cloze reading test. 
Simililary, when one see a "gap" in a draft, one will feel a 
tendency to close the gap, to make whole, the draft. The 
challenge for composition teachers, of course, is to 
instruct the student writers in such a way as for them to 
"see" the gaps in their drafts so that they will then feel 
this natural tendency toward closure. 
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The principle of restructuring is yet another 
contribution from Gestalt psychology toward an understanding 
of global coherence, especially when the composing process 
is viewed as an exercise in problem-solving. Gleitman 
relates that restructuring "involves a dramatic shift in the 
way [a] problem is viewed. . .. [T]his shift may be very 
sudden and is then experienced as a flash of insight, a 
sense of 'aha' ." (330). A similar sort of dramatic 
shift or sense of "aha" occurs when, after wrestling with 
how to structure a particular piece of discourse or how to 
frame a particular topic, one finally grasps the structure 
or the conceptual frame. This particular Gestalt principle 
is closely associated with the processes involved in 
creative thinking and hence will be prevalent in those 
composing situations involving reflective or emergent 
thinking that exploratory writing requires (Hairston & 
Ruszkiewicz 11-12). 
Just as the efficient cause was vital to Aristotle's 
understanding of the nature of knowledge (Selections 205), 
so too is the property of Gestalt vital to the cognitive 
perspective of global coherence. As Aristotle's efficient 
cause explains the driving force involved in change or 
stability, Gestalt entails a natural and powerful "driving 
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force" in humans to relate the part to the whole, and it is 
this part-to-whole (or whole-to-part) relationship which 
lies at the crux of this study of global coherence, which 
was defined at the beginning as "the comprehensive, 
systematic connection of constitutive elements of a text of 
logical discourse, with a consistent emphasis on both the 
totality [the whole] of the text and on the interrelatedness 
of its constituents [its parts]" (chapter I, p. 2). 
Central Cognitive Processes 
central cognitive processes, along with the given/new 
relationship and the tendency toward Gestalt, are basic to 
human thought and form a sUbstantial portion of the 
cognitive universals all humans share. The linguistic 
elements of global coherence, i.e., repetition, anaphora, 
cataphora, and ellipsis, help maintain logical identity, and 
the given/new relationship provides a point of logical 
orientation, but central cognitive processes serve dual 
purposes, for they are both "pathways" along which humans 
experience outer and inner reality as well as the "nuts and 
bolts" elements humans use as they respond to the Gestalt 
impetus and attempt to construct satisfactory part-to-whole 
and whole-to-part relationships. 
since classical times, rhetoricians have known of 
Aristotle's topoi, which he viewed as places of the mind and 
ways of finding something to say (The Rhetoric 154). Ross 
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Winterowd uses the concept of a "grammar of coherence" in 
order to understand better the composing process (828-35). 
Mary Lawrence, drawing from Jerome Bruner, uses the concept 
of "structural vocabulary" as a pivot in her approach to 
composition (5). Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey 
Leech, and Jan Svartvik use the term "logical connecters" to 
designate numerous logical relationships between clauses 
(661-76). Rhetorical handbooks use terms such as 
transitions, modes, thought patterns, and patterns of 
organization (Bain; Davidson; Hairston & Ruszkiewicz; Corder 
& Ruszkiewicz). These various terms have in common their 
recognition of central cognitive processes. Each 
composition theorist above employs in his or her approach 
central cognitive processes, whether singly when using a 
process such as cause and effect, antecedent and 
consequence, or genus and division, or in combination with 
other central cognitive processes as in the expository or 
argumentative modes. 
Central cognitive processes are unique, for they not 
only occur at the limen on the explicit-implicit continuum 
of cohering elements, but they also enable humans to 
generate knowledge as well as organize it. Consequently, 
central cognitive processes are vital for the invention and 
arrangement aspects of the composing process and therefore 
merit special attention. 
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Jerry Fodor, in Modularity of Mind, theorizes about a 
functional taxonomy of cognition. In his theory, the 
concept of central systems occupies a key role; the 
characteristics of these central systems are described 
below. (A more detailed account of the taxonomy is found in 
Appendix II.) 
not hardwired/unstable: neuroanatomy 
"relatively diffuse" (118) 
quasi assembled: a larger system composed 
of simpler systems 
informationally unencapsulated: central 
systems access information from each other 
and from modules 
domain neutral: "cut across cognitive 
domains" (101) 
computationally global: may draw on other 
central systems or modules to perform 
operations 
sensitive to belief system: during 
computation, central systems consider an 
individual's set of beliefs 
isotropic: confirmation-relevant facts can 
be "drawn from anywhere in the field of 
previously established empirical truths" (105) 
Quineian: "the degree of confirmation 
assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive 
to properties of the entire belief system; as 
it were, the shape of our whole science bears 
on the epistemic status of each scientific 
hypothesis" (107) 
optional engagement: the operation of a 
central system is not necessarily mandatory; 
it can be elective 
variable speed: may be very slow or 
instantaneous 
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These central systems may be thought of as central 
cognitive processes; that is, central cognitive processes 
are specific central systems which possess distinguishing 
characteristics of their own while simultaneously possessing 
all the characteristics detailed above in Fodor's theory. 
Further, these central cognitive processes, as stated 
earlier, not only guide an individual along "pathways" 
through and by which one experiences and cogitates outer and 
inner reality, but they also serve as "nuts and bolts" 
elements in the individual's attempts to form coherent views 
of that which is real in the past and present, and of that 
which may be possible in the future. 
In the introduction of this study (pp. 7, 11-12), I 
asserted the necessity of instructing student writers to go 
beyond the literal level of language and thought so that 
they will not only think at the analytic, interpretive, 
evaluative, and creative levels, but also articulate at 
these higher levels of thought in globally coherent essays. 
I argued that writing teachers are remiss if they do not 
encourage student writers to look at the underlying logical 
relationships of the clauses they are connecting and the 
discourse blocks they are constructing, for this knowledge 
will give them an increased understanding of how parts of a 
composition cohere in fundamental, cognitive ways. The 
characteristics of central systems detailed above--inherent 
in the central cognitive processes listed below--are those 
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"fundamental, cognitive ways," and it is the central 
cognitive processes that enable an individual to think in 
non-linear ways, yet also enable him or her to attempt to 
express non-linear thought within the constraints of linear 
language. 
While one's expressions in language are constrained by 
linearity, one's thinking and mental imagery are not 
(chapter II, pp. 36-40). A significant feature of central 
cognitive processes, and to a lesser degree, of the 
given/new relationship and of Gestalt, is their inherent 
capacity for enabling non-linear thought. Waldron relates 
that the leap from sign to symbol is monumental because 
symbolic reference is itself a multi-faceted cognitive 
operation (50). When one uses a linguistic symbol, one not 
only assigns a label to an entity, thus employing a 
referential function to the symbol, but one also assigns to 
the symbol a logical identity by which one distinguishes it 
from other items, thus employing a differential function; as 
one differentiates between referents, one naturally forms 
categories; thus, the use of a linguistic symbol is also the 
beginning of the categorial function, and categorization 
entails central cognitive processes such as contrast, 
comparison, classification, and hierarchiazation. Language 
and higher thought, then, truly develop pari passu, for to 
use the linguistic symbol is to engage fundamental and 
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powerful cognitive systems, and yet without the linguistic 
symbol, these same cognitive systems would be inexpressible. 
Thus, the listing below of central cognitive processes 
as elements in the cognitive perspective of global coherence 
is also the listing of powerful processes that cut across 
cognitive domains, processes that are not just 
inter-connected, but which are isotropic. They are also 
processes that access long-term and short-term memory, that 
are engaged at the option of the individual person, and that 
may be used at a speed dependent on the discretion of the 
indi vidual. 
Cognitive Elements of Global Coherence 
Below are sixteen central cognitive processes listed in 
a developmental continuum, along with illustrative examples 
and explicit markers. The developmental continuum is 
tentative, but it may be seen as a provisional step toward 
understanding how one central cognitive process is logically 
prior to another. Jung argues that "differentiation is the 
essence, the sine qua non of consciousness" (95). Contrast, 
then, may be thought of as a human's first cognitive act; it 
could first occur in the womb when the fetus becomes aware 
of the me/not me distinction regarding its body and the 
confining wall of the womb. such a distinction is used by 
Edmund Leach in his elaborating the notion of binary coding, 
a property which, he argues, is common to human 
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communication (62-63). Further, if categorizing is defined 
as grouping by differences or similarities, then both 
contrasting and comparing must be logically prior to 
categorizing. similarly, if hierarchiaizing is seen as an 
ordering of categories according to levels of subordination 
or superordination, then contrasting, comparing, and 
categorizing are logically prior to it. Likewise, 
analogizing presumes contrasting and comparing, at the very 
least, because it consists of drawing parallels or 
similarities between or among dissimilar entities. However, 
such entities may also be hierarchies themselves, and thus 
analogizing presumes hierarchiazation, as well as contrast, 
comparison, and analogy. synthesizing, defined as the 
expressing of coherence among seemingly disparate entities 
or relationships, is listed in the final position because 
when one synthesizes, one is free to draw on any combination 
of the other central cognitive processes in order to express 
such a coherence. 
The purpose of the list, then, is not to establish its 
inclusiveness, but to embrace under a single rubric such 
concepts as Aristotle's topoi, winterowd's grammar of 
coherence, Lawrence's structural vocabulary, Quirk, 
Greenbaum, Leech, and Svartik's logical connecters, and 
terms often used in handbooks or within the discipline such 
as transitions, modes, thought patterns, and patterns of 
organization. 
[3:5] CONTRASTING: the indicating of differences between 
entities 
implicit rendering: 
Thomas Jefferson was a very orderly and 
temperate man; Samuel Adams was 
absent-minded and hot-tempered. 
explicit rendering: 
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Thomas Jefferson was a very orderly and 
temperate man, unlike Samuel Adams, who was 
absent-minded and hot-tempered. 
explicit markers: on the contrary, by 
comparison, on the one hand . • . on the other 
hand, by way of contrast, instead, but, 
although, however, differ from, different from, 
still, otherwise, even so, nevertheless, still, 
dissimilarly, less than, more than, faster than 
(etc.), in contrast, in opposition, on the 
opposite side, while, admittedly, in reality, of 
course, actually, true 




Please place the green chair here, the red 
one there, and the couch in between. 
explicit markers: next to, alongside of, in, 
into, out of, outside of, over, under, 
underneath, below, above, across, among, around, 
before, behind, beneath, beside, beyond, off, 
opposite, round, through, within, north, south, 
east, west, to the right, to the left, front, 
middle, rear, side, adjacent midpoint, endpoint, 
diagonal, edge, parallel, perpendicular, 
co-planar, overlapping, vertical, horizontal 




Jefferson believed passionately in freedom 
of thought and freedom of religion. 
Franklin, another "founding father," 
believed strongly in freedom of thought and 
freedom of religion. 
explicit rendering: 
Jefferson believed passionately in freedom 
of thought and freedom of religion. So, 
too, did Franklin. 
explicit markers: as, just as, similarly, 
similar to, in the same way, almost the same, at 
the same rate as, like, alike, likewise, in like 
manner, correspond to, correspondingly, 
resemble, resemblance, to be parallel in . . . , 
to have ... in common, common features, 
characteristics, etc. 
[3:8] POSITING CAUSE AND EFFECT: the stating of an action 
or a condition and its 
result 
implicit rendering: 
Unfortunately, John went out 
night. He drove recklessly. 




NOW, he is in 
the waist 
Unfortunately, John went out drinking last 
night. Because he did so, he drove 
recklessly. Now, as a tragic consequence, 
he is in the hospital, paralyzed from the 
waist down. 
explicit markers: so, so that, so much (so) 
that, thus, consequently, as a consequence, in 
consequence, therefore, accordingly, for, for 
fear (that), for the purpose that, for this 
reason, as a result, hence, because, because of, 
owing to, since, due to, being that, in that, in 
the hope that, seeing that, so much that, 
inasmuch as, forasmuch as, in view of, with this 
in mind, with this intention, to the end that, 
lest, if, even if, only if, unless, in case, 
provided that, providing that, on (the) 
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condition that, in the event that given that, 
granted (that), granting (that), as long as, so 
long as, then, if so, in that case, that being 
the case, under those circumstances, if not, 
otherwise 
[3:9] CATEGORIZING: grouping by similarities or differences 
implicit rendering: 
Apples, oranges, and tangerines contain 
seeds. Fish, beef, and mutton are meats. 
explicit rendering: 
Apples, oranges, and tangerines are alike 
in that they all contain seeds. Fish, 
beef, and mutton are similar in that they 
all are meats. 
explicit markers: as, just as, similarly, 
similar to, in the same way, almost the same, at 
the same rate as, like, alike, likewise, in like 
manner, correspond to, correspondingly, 
resemble, resemblance, to be parallel in . . . , 
to have . . . in common, common features, 
characteristics, etc., on the contrary, instead, 
by comparison, on the one hand . . . on the 
other hand, by way of contrast, but, although, 
however, differ from, different from, still, 
otherwise, even so, nevertheless, still, 
dissimilarly, less than, more than, faster than 
(etc.), in contrast, in opposition, on the 
opposite side, while, admittedly, in reality, of 
course, actually, true 
[3:10] SPECIFYING: the providing of a detail at a lower 
level of generalization for an entity at 
a greater level of generalization 
implicit rendering: 
Diogenes was a simple man. His only 
material possessions were his toga and a 
bowl. 
explicit rendering: 
Diogenes was a simple man. For example, 
his only material possessions were his toga 
and a bowl. 
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explicit markers: for example, for instance, for 
one thing, to illustrate, in one instance, in 
other words, as follows, as proof, let me 
illustrate, let me cite as proof, in 
substantiation, to substantiate, as an 
illustration, in this instance, as an example, 
in practice, according to statistics, according 
to statistical evidence, such as, especially, 
particularly, in particular, notably, by way of 
example, namely, to be specific, specifically, 
that is (to say); take ... , for example; 
consider . . , for example 




Although now regarded by many as a quaint 
form of transportation, a bicycle consists 
of several highly-tooled parts, including 
tires, rims, spokes, a chain, and cables. 
explicit markers: consists of, is composed of, 
divides into, includes, including, have, has, 
components, parts, aspects, qualities, 
attributes, characteristics, factors, eras, 
times, regions, sector, factor, piece, particle, 
section, member, segment, constituent, element, 
ingredient, feature, contents 
[3:12] INDUCING: the drawing of a conclusion 
from particulars 
implicit rendering: 
Holmes turned to Watson. "The 
chemical tests confirm that Eggert's hands 
had carried sulphur. Eggert was at the 
scene of the crime. And he certainly had 
sufficient motive." 
"Eggert is our man!" exclaimed Watson. 
But Holmes only furrowed his brow and 
said, "Perhaps." 
explicit rendering: 
Holmes turned to Watson. "The 
chemical tests confirm that Eggert's hands 
had carried sulphur. Eggert was at the 
scene of the crime. And he certainly had 
sufficient motive." 
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"Therefore," exclaimed Watson, "Eggert 
is our mant " 
But Holmes only furrowed his brow and 
said, "Perhaps." 
explicit markers: so, thus, consequently, 
therefore, accordingly, for these reasons, as a 
result, hence, because, because of, owing to, 
since, due to, it follows, being that, seeing 
that, as, inasmuch as, in view of, owing to 
[3:13] CHRONOLOGIZING: the ordering of entities 
according to time 
implicit rendering: 
He unlocked the door and entered 
room. He turned on the lights. 





First, he unlocked the door and entered the 
dark room. Next, he turned on the lights. 
Then, the room erupted in shouts and 
huzzahs of celebration. 
explicit markers: then, now, nowadays, at the 
present, when, before, after, while, during, 
between ... and ... , in (month/year), in 
the (period of the day, e.g., morning, 
afternoon), on (day of week or date), since .. 
. , later, earlier, formerly every (number) 
(years, months, days, minutes, etc.), at the 
turn of the century (decade, etc.), in the first 
(second, etc.) part of the century (month, week, 
day, etc.), in the l800s, etc., at birth, in 
childhood, in infancy, in adolescence, as an 
adult, in adulthood, in old age, at death, 
simultaneously, simultaneous with, at the same 
time as, contemporaneously, co-eval, former, 
latter, previous, previously, prior to, first, 
second, etc., in the first place, in the second 
place, etc., to begin with, to end with, next, 
subsequently, at last, in conclusion, finally 
99 
[3:14] GENERALIZING: the stating of a principle based upon 
specific observations 
implicit rendering: 
Rafe is only seven years old; he did not 
realize he was plagiarizing Lincoln. 
Olivia is only three years old; she did not 
know that it is wrong to take cookies 
without asking. Children are innocent in 
things such as these. 
explicit rendering: 
Rafe is only seven years old; he did not 
realize he was plagiarizing Lincoln. 
Olivia is only three years old; she did not 
know that it is wrong to take cookies 
without asking. All children are innocent 
in things such as these. 
explicit markers: generally, generally speaking, 
on the whole, all, every, never, always 




American government can be subdivided into 
four levels: local, county, state, and 
national. Each of these consists of 
branches comprised of subordinate 
departments, bureaus, and ministries. 
explicit markers: classified, subdivided, 
levels, graded, sorted, ranked, arranged, 
ordered, organized, stratified, bracketed, 
codified, lower, higher, consists of, is 
composed of, divides into, includes, including, 
have, has, components, parts, aspects, 
qualities, attributes, characteristics, factors, 
eras, times, regions, sector, factor, piece, 
particle, section, member, segment, constituent, 
element, ingredient, feature, contents, each, 
every, single, respective 
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[3:16] DEDUCING: the drawing of a conclusion by reasoning 
from a generality 
implicit rendering: 
Gringoes have big feet, pale skin, and 
light eyes. Hans has big feet, pale skin, 
and light eyes. Hans is a gringo. 
explicit rendering: 
All gringoes have 
light eyes. Hans 
and light eyes. 
gringo. 
big feet, pale skin, and 
has big feet, pale skin, 
consequently, Hans is a 
explicit markers: generally, generally speaking, 
on the whole, all, every, never, always so, so 
that, so much (so) that, thus, consequently, as 
a consequence, in consequence, therefore 
accordingly, for, for fear (that), for the 
purpose that, for this reason, as a result, 
hence, because, because of, owing to, since, due 
to, being that, in that, in the hope that, 
seeing that, so much that, inasmuch as, 
forasmuch as, in view of, with this in mind, 
with this intention, to the end that, lest, if, 
even if, only if, unless, in case, provided 
that, providing that, on (the) conditions that, 
in the event that given that, granted (that), 
granting (that), as long as, so long as, then, 
if so, in that case, that being the case, under 
those circumstances, if not, otherwise 
[3:17] ABSTRACTING: the assigning of a quality or an 
intangible to an entity, often 
tangible 
implicit rendering: 
Daily, she sacrifices for the poor. 
Hourly, she prays for the lost. By the 
minute, she toils to heal the sick. Mother 
Theresa is love. 
explicit rendering: 
Daily, she sacrifices for the poor. 
Hourly, she prays for the lost. By the 
minute, she toils to heal the sick. In 
essence, Mother Theresa is love. 
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explicit markers: in essence, essentially, in a 
word, quintessentially, obviously, clearly, 
without a doubt, nothing but ..• , sheer, 
pure, purely 
[3:18] HYPOTHESIZING: the stating of a possible explanation 




If Jonas Salk were to develop a vaccine for 
AIDS, he surely would be award-ed another 
Nobel Prize. 
explicit markers: if . . . then, if so, had, 
should, in (that) case, provided that, providing 
that, on the condition that, in the event that, 
given that, granted (that), granting (that) as 
long as, so long as, even if, only if, that 
being the case, under those circumstances, 
unless, if not, otherwise; were, would, and 
other subjunctive renderings 
[3:19] ANALOGIZING: the expressing of similarity between or 
among dissimilar entities or 
relationships 
implicit rendering: 
The successful actor can perform on the 
stage in a variety of roles. The 
successful person can function well in a 
number of positions. 
explicit rendering: 
Just as the successful actor can perform on 
the stage in a variety of roles, so too can 
the successful person function well in a 
number of positions. 
explicit markers: analogously, as, just as, 
similarly, similar to, in the same way, almost 
the same, like, alike, likewise, in like manner, 
correspond to, correspondingly, resemble, 
resemblance, to be parallel in . . . , to have . 
. . in common, common features, characteristics, 
etc. 
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[3:20] SYNTHESIZING: this, the paramount central cognitive 
process, transcends analogy and 
engages all other central cognitive 
processes to express coherence among 
seemingly disparate entities 
implicit rendering: 
Hydrogen is a plentiful yet explosive gas. 
Mercury is a shiny and toxic liquid quite 
sensitive to temperatures. Iron is a hard 
and somewhat brittle solid which decomposes 
when exposed to air and water. They are 
fundamental substances called elements and 
cannot be decomposed into other substances. 
explicit rendering: 
Hydrogen is a plentiful yet explosive gas. 
Mercury is a shiny and toxic liquid quite 
sensitive to temperature. Iron is a hard 
and somewhat brittle solid which decomposes 
when exposed to air and water. However 
different they may be superficially, all 
three share a unique characteristic. They 
are fundamental substances called elements 
and cannot be decomposed into other 
substances. 
explicit markers: the central cognitive process 
of synthesis is explicitly rendered using 
explicit markers from any of the other central 
cognitive processes 
An Explicit-Implicit Continuum 
Our treatment of the linguistic perspective of global 








It was noted that because of the mandatory explicitness of 
the linguistic elements of global coherence, all four 
categories--repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and 
ellipsis--are located at the explicit end of the continuum, 
but because ellipsis has an implicit component, it is also 
located at the implicit end of the continuum. 
It was also noted that the linguistic elements of 
global coherence have special properties which serve an 
essential role in the cohering of discourse, and that among 
these properties are their dominant word form, their small 
number and high frequency in a text, and their mandatory 
explicitness. 
Just as the linguistic elements have special functions 
which serve to enable global coherence, so, too, do the 
cognitive elements of global coherence. Paramount among 
these functions is parallel distributed processing. This 
function accounts for the interconnection of the above 
listed central cognitive processes across domains, thus 
yielding a property the significance of which is difficult 
to overestimate: utility. If the linguistic elements of 
global coherence perform a vital function·by maintaining the 
identity of the given in any particular given/new 
relationship, the cognitive elements of global coherence 
enable the writer to consummate the given/new relationship 
by allowing him or her to bring to the "given" the "new" 
constituent, or to fashion any logical relationship, be it 
104 
one of contrast, analysis, or analogy. Further, the 
versatility of central cognitive processes enables an 
individual to do this at the level of clause, paragraph, 
essay, or book, at the micro-state or at the macro-state, 
depending on the degree of chunking. Chapter four will deal 
with the contextual salience perspective of global coherence 
and demonstrate that not only do humans use central 
cognitive processes at various levels, but they also use 
them in various combinations, depending on their purpose and 
on specific elements of contextual salience. 
Unlike the linguistic elements of global coherence, 
which always have a mandatory explicit component manifested 
in the text through and by language expressly for 
co-referential purposes, the cognitive elements of global 
coherence are often manifested in a liminal manner and serve 
as a threshold at which the explicit/implicit distinction 
blurs, as the examples above illustrate. Consequently, the 
explicit-implicit continuum, with elements from both the 














The central cognitive processes occupy the limen 
portion of the continuum because of the variable nature of 
their overt markers; at times, their overt markers are 
necessary, but often they are optional, depending on the 
rhetorical situation. 
In sum, central cognitive processes are universal to 
humans, operate freely across all cognitive domains, and 
process information in a parallel, distributed fashion. 
Hence, central cognitive processes have great utility for 
thinking in general, and for the student of writing in 
particular. Their ability to generate as well as organize 
thought invests them with a unique value in the composition 
classroom. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTEXTUAL SALIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
OF GLOBAL COHERENCE 
Most humans strive to make sense of life, to discover a 
coherence in, if not of, life. History and literature are 
replete with humans engaged in this quest, from figures of 
note such as Solomon, laden with riches and satiated with 
pleasures, who continued to quest for coherence in life as 
he wrote Ecclesiastes and much of Proverbs, to the "small" 
characters in Tolstoy's War and Peace and Anna Karenina, and 
those of Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, Crime and 
Punishment, and The Idiot, who from their inauspicious 
beginnings and endings raise the enduring questions of love 
and hate, justice and injustice, of faith in and doubt of 
life itself. Regardless of their station in life, these 
characters wrestle with and through language in their quest 
for coherence. Language is indispensable in this quest. As 
Knoblach and Brannon tell us, 
Modern rhetorical theory, beginning as early as 
the seventeenth century, finds a closer connection 
between language and thought, discourse and 
knowledge, than ancient speculation had supposed. 
Far from serving an optional, ceremonial function, 
composition--the forming process at the heart of 
writing--is essentially related to learning, to 
the individual's personal search for coherence in 
experience. It is also, as a manifestation of 
human symbolic capacities, a natural endowment in 
essence, not a technical skill. (4) 
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In this quest for coherence, then, humans use "the 
natural endowment" of language, whether in life in general 
or in a composition class in particular. 
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., maintains that "the peculiar nature 
of coherence . . . is not an absolute, but a dependent 
quality" (237). He goes on to argue that 
The laws of coherence are variable; they depend 
upon the nature of the total meaning under 
consideration. Two meanings ("dark" and "bright," 
for example) which cohere in one context may not 
cohere in another. "Dark with excessive bright" 
makes excellent sense in Paradise Lost, but if a 
reader found the passage in a textbook on plant 
pathology, he would assume that he confronted a 
misprint for "Dark with excessive blight." 
Coherence depends on the context, and it is 
helpful to recall our definition of context: it is 
a sense of the whole meaning, constituted of 
explicit partial meanings plus a horizon of 
expectations and probabilities. (1190) 
Traditionally, the surface language of a text has been 
the focus for the analysis of coherence. As the review of 
college handbooks in the beginning of this study 
demonstrates, answers to questions of coherence were sought 
routinely in the surface language of a text (Hodges & 
Whitten, McCrimmon, Hairston & Ruszkiewicz, stewart, Corder 
& Ruszkiewicz). In actuality, however, the surface language 
of a text does not bear all the burden of achieving global 
coherence, as the implicit nature of some of the central 
cognitive processes illustrates. Consequently, the scope of 
this study includes the contextually salient perspective as 
well as the linguistic and cognitive perspectives. By 
considering implicit elements as well as explicit ones, one 
more accurately represents how various elements of a text 
contribute to the global coherence of a composition or 
essay. 
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While the linguistic elements of global coherence may 
be used the most frequently and the most explicitly in the 
text of a composition or essay, and the central cognitive 
processes of global coherence serve bridging or liminal 
functions, at times explicit and at times implicit, elements 
of the contextually salient perspective are manifested in 
the text through implied but powerful, fundamental, and 
culturally-related concepts such as epistemological frames, 
central metaphors, sociological models, and warrants. 
Because the contextually salient perspective of global 
coherence is culturally related, it often seems to be 
omnipresent and ubiquitous. Paradoxically, it is often the 
most implicit aspect of global coherence, seldom manifesting 
itself explicitly or directly through language meant to be 
understood at the literal level, as in the linguistic and 
cognitive global categories. Instead, elements of the 
contextually salient perspective manifest themselves in 
language meant to be understood at the interpretive level in 
the form of word choice, grammatical structure (voice, 
nominalizations, etc.), rhetorical pattern of sentences, 
thesis placement, and prevalence of particular central 
cognitive processes, often resulting in emphasis on a 
particular arrangement or pattern of thought. 
The following overview of the contextually salient 
perspective will examine the interrelationships of 
epistemological frames, central metaphors, sociological 
models, and warrants as they serve to effect the global 
coherence of a text. 
Overview of the Contextually Salient Perspective 
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Epistemology deals with how humans know what they know 
and what they accept as sensible and logical, and hence, 
what they view as coherent. A human's epistemological 
framework, then, subtends and permeates all his or her other 
logical relationships and operations. 
In the West, two main epistemological frameworks have 
evolved, die Geisteswissenschaften and die Naturwissen-
schaften (Dilthey). Die Geisteswissenschaften is an 
inclusive framework which accords equal epistemological 
status to intangible entities such as thoughts, ideas, 
abstractions, dreams, and logical relationships, as well as 
to tangible entities such as those represented by one or 
more of the five senses of sight, sound, touch, taste, and 
smell. Die Naturwissenschaften is an exclusive framework 
which accords greater epistemological status to tangible 
data, ostensibly accepting as valid only that which has 
empirical characteristics. Another key distinction made 
between these two dominant frameworks is that die 
Geisteswissenschaften is essentially retrodictive and die 
Naturwissenschaften is essentially predictive. 
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Often, this dichotomy has come to be viewed as a 
mutually exclusive one: a datum must fall under one or the 
other frameworks in either/or fashion. This dichotomy is 
evident throughout American culture. Colleges and 
universities are divided between Arts (die Geistes-
wissenschaften) and Sciences (die Naturwissenschaften) i even 
among the sciences, some are called "soft science," e.g., 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology (die Geistes-
wissenschaften), and others are called "hard science," e.g., 
biology, physics, and chemistry (die Naturwissenschaften)i 
salaries and prestige are distributed according to this 
dichotomy, with those working in the Naturwissenschaften 
often receiving higher pay and greater social status, e.g., 
the mathematician, the physicist, and the chemist, as 
opposed to those working in the Geisteswissenschaften, e.g., 
the anthropologist, the social worker, and the historian. 
Regrettably, this dichotomy forces students to over-
emphasize one framework at the expense of the other, or to 
exclude one altogether except for rudimentary courses in 
fulfilling general education requirements. Such a dichotomy 
has another unfortunate consequence: many students 
erroneously believe they are either "science" students or 
"arts & humanities" students, and thus they fail to benefit 
fully from the entire spectrum of knowledge and learning 
that life and academe have to offer them. 
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The consequences of epistemological frames are 
apparent. For example, the seminarian operating from the 
premises of Naturwissenschaften will likely encounter much 
difficulty, just as the behavioral psychologist who admits 
only empirical data will meet with frustration. In effect, 
the epistemological frame serves as a filter for what may be 
considered logical. Thus, an epistemological frame 
influences a person's life in the most fundamental of ways. 
It determines one's very view of reality and the manner by 
which one deals with this reality. An epistemological 
frame, then, determines what is sensible and logical, and 
thus, what is coherent for an individual. 
Central Metaphors 
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
write that metaphors have traditionally been viewed in 
philosophy and linguistics as "a matter of peripheral 
interest" (ix). In their book, however, Lakoff and Johnson 
provide copious linguistic evidence which refutes this view. 
Indeed, they argue convincingly that "metaphor is pervasive 
in everyday language and thought" (ix). This study in 
global coherence follows this same argument. Consequently, 
metaphor comprises the second element examined in the 
contextually salient perspective. 
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The word metaphor derives from the Greek metapherein, 
meaning to transfer or bear across (825). In relating 
metaphor to coherence, meanings of the word bear may be 
helpful: to support and move, to hold in the mind, to 
sustain, to disseminate, to lead, to give birth to, to 
permit growth of, to extend in a dir~ction indicated or 
implied (115). 
Metaphor is defined as a type of one of the central 
cognitive processes, analogy. Metaphor consists of two 
pairs of elements; one half of each pair, called the 
attributant, expresses qualities or characteristics. The 
remaining half of each pair has a naming function and is 
called the nominal. These terms are used because they are 
discipline neutral and functional in nature, as opposed to 
those common to literary criticism such as tenor, vehicle, 
and image, which presuppose a theory of tension in treating 
metaphor (Richards). Instead, the relationship used here 
emphasizes a mapping between cognitive domains. 
Consider the following three metaphorical expressions: 
A) That boxer is a tiger; B) Hought is pronounced so that it 
rhymes with bought; C) The world is a stage. 
Metaphor A may be thought of as consisting of the 
following two pairs of elements: 
elemental pair 1: 
animal with great strength & quickness (attributant) 
tiger (nominal) 
elemental pair 2: 
man with great strength & quickness (attributant) 
man (nominal) 
Metaphor A => That boxer is a tiger. 
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Metaphor B (Glass, Holyoak & Santa) may be thought of 
as consisting of the following two pairs of elements: 
elemental pair 1: 
consonant cluster/known pronunciation (attributant) 
bought (nominal) 
elemental pair 2: 
consonant cluster/unknown pronunciation (attributant) 
hought (nominal) 
Metaphor B => Hought rhymes with bought. 
Metaphor C may be thought of as consisting of the 
following two pairs of elements: 
elemental pair 1: 
where actors roleplay (attributant) 
stage (nominal) 
elemental pair 2: 
where humans function in various roles (attributant) 
unknown life model (nominal) 
Metaphor C => The world is a stage. 
All metaphors derive from two elemental pairs. Of the 
four elements (two attributants and two nominals), at least 
three must be known. Of the three known elements, cognitive 
focus is on the two parallel elements, either 
attributant:attributant or nominal:nominal. Further, any 
number of the central cognitive processes subsumed by 
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analogy (chapter III, p. 93) can be utilized in order to 
achieve the metaphor. Hence, the emphasis is on a mapping 
between cognitive domains rather than a theory of tension. 
A metaphor may serve as a device for the bridging of 
linguistic, cognitive, and experiential gaps. Linguistic 
bridging occurs when one has the thoughts and the 
commonality of experience, but not the language, due to a 
deficit in the speaker's idiolect or in the language itself: 
for example, a speaker of English's resorting to the German 
word blitzkrieg to describe a battle tactic in the European 
Theater of World War II. Cognitive bridging occurs when one 
cannot apprehend meaning despite adequate language and 
commonality of experience: for example, the use of the hand 
to explain the concept of base ten in mathematics. 
Experiential bridging occurs when one cannot apprehend 
meaning despite adequate language and cognition: for 
example, an extra-terrestial's borrowing from Earth culture 
in order to explain to an Earthling a circumstance peculiar 
to the extra-terrestial's world. A metaphor may also serve 
as an expressive device, the kind of which is often used in 
poetry, colorful language, or literature: 
That boxer is a tiger! 
or 
Or ever the silver cord is loosed, 
or the golden bowl is broken, 
or the pitcher is broken at the fountain, 
or the wheel broken at the cistern; 
Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, 
and the spirit shall return unto God, who gave it. 
(Ecclesiastes 12:6-7) 
A metaphor may also serve as a condensed expression: 
for example, in answer to the question "What kind of 
politician was Margaret Thatcher?" one replies "She was a 
female version of Ronald Reagan, but more cerebral and 
candid." 
Thus, metaphor is a much-used central cognitive 
process; one often uses a metaphor as one attempts to 
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explain to others or to one's inner self how one aspect of 
reality relates to another. Weighty expressions such as 
"life is a journey" or "the world is a stage" and less 
weighty expressions such as "that boxer is a tiger" or 
"she's a trip" help one communicate or understand what one 
thinks or feels. Lakoff and Johnson relate that metaphor is 
"as much a part of our functioning as our sense of touch" 
(239) . Accordingly, a tendency towards a wide use of 
metaphor seems second nature, and rarely does one shy from 
it; rather, more often than not, when a particular metaphor 
fails, one searches with alacrity for other metaphors that 
might better convey one's understanding. .One might think "X 
is like Y--no, like Z! No, X is like A! Yes, that's it! X 
is A!" But, of the many metaphors humans employ daily and 
hourly to help them better communicate or understand, they, 
in a desire to simplify life and their comprehension of it, 
often employ a metaphor which subsumes all other metaphors, 
and indeed, permeates their thoughts and emotions and either 
118 
reinforces their instincts or conflicts with them. Such a 
metaphor may be called a central metaphor. 
A central metaphor serves humans in two crucial ways, 
as guide and as touchstone. A central metaphor serves as 
guide when it indicates to an individual one's role, and 
consequently, one's behavior, in life. Just as importantly, 
a central metaphor also serves as guide when it indicates 
the role and behavior one comes to expect from fellow humans 
and from one's environment. A central metaphor serves as 
touchstone when one returns to it to reassure oneself of 
one's own weltanschauung and to re-affirm concord with one's 
epistemological frame. In a sense, it serves as a place in 
one's consciousness where one can always go in order to sort 
out the variables and changes of life. Central metaphors, 
then, are of the utmost importance in life. 
Because they serve as shorthand versions of 
epistemological frames, their number is few, and humans 
normally use a small, consistent number of them, for they 
must be reasonably consistent not only with one's 
epistemological frame, but also with one's belief systems. 
Indeed, some humans choose to die before they can or will 
exchange particular central metaphors. Witness the 
individual who has embraced the central metaphor of chance 
and uses it as an excuse to continue an addiction to alcohol 
or to gambling, or witness the individual who has taken for 
one's own the central metaphor of games and competes 
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according to an agreed-upon set of rules for designated 
prizes (Brown). Thus, central metaphors are quite powerful 
and exert great influence on individuals. 
It was noted in chapter three (p. 89) that central 
cognitive processes are isotropic and sensitive to belief 
systems. Central metaphors are particularly isotropic and 
sensitive to belief systems. Whenever one seeks to apply or 
validate a specific central metaphor, one is utilizing the 
central cognitive process of analogy, and due to its 
position in the hierarchy of all central cognitive 
processes, one may employ any of the subsumed central 
cognitive processes (only the central cognitive process of 
synthesis is not subsumed by analogy). Further, because of 
the isotropic quality of central cognitive processes, one 
can draw from "anywhere in the field of previously 
established empirical truths" to confirm that a 
configuration of data is indeed what it seems to be (Fodor 
105). For example, in order for one to use the central 
cognitive process of classification to determine that the 
object that a set of adjectives is describing is an animate 
male human, one may draw from any of one's empirical 
experiences to confirm that the object is actually an 
animate male human. 
But central cognitive processes, and by extension, 
central metaphors, are not limited to empirical data, for, 
as Fodor argues, they are also sensitive to one's belief 
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system. For example, if an individual were not acquainted 
with or did not accept transvestism and saw a male dressed 
in hose, high heels, dress, make-up, and a wig, that 
individual might not classify the male as a male regardless 
of the adjectives indicating that the person was indeed an 
animate male human. Not only are individual central 
cognitive processes sensitive to one's belief system in the 
intra-cultural sense, but also in the cross-cultural sense. 
While the dominant thought pattern in English is linear, 
that in semitic languages is often parallel, and in many of 
the oriental languages, the dominant thought pattern is that 
of a spiral (Kaplan 410). Thus, the belief systems of the 
individual and of the individual's culture influence 
significantly what and how data are classified, 
hypothesized, abstracted, and analogized, for example, as 
well as whether the dominant arrangement in a text is of one 
particular order or another. If the data are not processed 
or arranged in accordance with the belief system, the result 
is judged incongruous with one's central metaphor, and quite 
possibly, incoherent. 
Accordingly, Lakoff argues that metaphors go beyond the 
traditional view of figures of speech (tropes): metaphors 
are "figures of thought" (215). This view more accurately 
reflects the variety of elements and immense scope of 
central metaphors; however, it also reveals the complexity 
of central metaphors for the following reasons: 
1) All thought ultimately derives from time and 
space relations, and it is arguable that time is a 
function of space, or at the very least, is 
dependent upon space for its conceptualization 
(Jones 77-83). 
2) Central metaphors are ubiquitous: they exist in 
unconscious as well as conscious cognition, and 
they may be instrumental in certain instances of 
intuition. Further, central metaphors, because 
they are metaphors, are a type of analogy, the 
central cognitive process which subsumes all other 
central cognitive processes except that of 
synthesis, and as a central cognitive process, is, 
among other characteristics, domain neutral and 
isotropic. 
3) Metaphors, due to their position in the 
hierarchy of central cognitive processes, are 
isotropic to a very great degree, and the greater 
the isotropism, the less one can comprehend the 
process (Fodor 106), and this property is 
intensified in a central metaphor because of its 
scope. 
Metaphor, then, is limited only by space and its 
relationship in the hierarchy of central cognitive 
processes: consequently, central metaphors overarch one's 
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thought processes and exert tremendous power and influence 
in one's perception of how various elements of perceived 
reality interrelate; indeed, central metaphors determine 
these very relationships. 
The following are categories of some.of the more 
dominant occidental central metaphors: the metaphor of 
growth, which has its formal roots in classical Greek 
thought and is seen in various guises, for example, as 
process or progress; the metaphor of drama, in which life is 
viewed as a stage and members of society perform various 
roles; the metaphor of chance, in which life is likened to a 
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game of chance or fortune; the metaphor of games, in which 
members of society compete according to an agreed-upon set 
of rules for designated prizes (Brown). Accordingly, central 
metaphors subtend virtually all the aspects of one's 
consciousness and thus, one's notion of what fits with what, 
what makes sense, what does not, and, significantly, what 
serves to effect coherence and what does not. 
Because of their powerful and deep influence, central 
metaphors lead to the formulation of sociological models, 
through and by which humans conduct their lives. All the 
sociological models sketched below "assume that human beings 
negotiate their way through life in quest for meaning" (st. 
Clair, "Language" 225), and that language is the medium of 
symbolic representation which humans use for the 
construction or understanding of social reality and the 
maintenance of cultural values. Further, language is the 
medium of symbolic representation for an individual, group, 
or society as problems, topics, or questions of self and 
society are explored in a quest for coherence. 
Within each of the four models of sociology outlined 
below, language is used in various ways as an individual 
engages in interpretive, analytical, critical, and creative 
thought, going beyond the level of signs, of surface 
impressions, and surface thinking. In so doing, the 
individual consciously and purposively uses language as a 
symbol system in an attempt to form or fit his developing 
123 
knowledge into a coherent whole. This treatment of central 
metaphors and sociological models does not imply that an 
individual will employ a fixed number of central metaphors 
and a particular sociological model and only those metaphors 
and model, although this may be the case in some instances. 
Rather, this treatment seeks to reveal how individuals may 
use various central metaphors and sociological models, 
including but not limited to those mentioned below. Some 
individuals may vary operative central metaphors and 
sociological models as circumstances dictate. 
Each of the two larger divisions of sociological 
models--symbolic interactionism and phenomenology--embodies 
the notion of social construction. Symbolic interactionism 
embodies the concept of a socially constructed world; 
phenomenology embodies the construction of social 
consciousness. Whether the sociological model is one of 
symbolic interactionism or of phenomenology, it may be 
subtended by a single central metaphor or a small number of 
central metaphors which act as a core of ad hoc 
epistemological frames which help an individual negotiate 
his or her way through life in some sort of coherent manner. 
For example, if one embraces the central metaphor that "all 
the world is a stage" and one has roles in which humans 
should perform, one very well may operate within the 
dramaturgical model; on the other hand, if one embraces the 
central metaphor that life is a jungle and "survival of the 
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fittest" is the rule, then one may operate within the 
ethnomethodological model. Likewise, if one accepts the 
central metaphor of "the Establishment," one may operate 
within the labeling model, or, if one subscribes, perhaps by 
default, to the central metaphor of fate, then one may 
operate within the existential model. (For a similar set of 
relationships, but based on linguistic models, see Lakoff 
and Johnson concerning "experiential gestalts," [77-86].) 
The following schemata seek to highlight contrasts and 
similarities between the dramaturgical and labelling theory 
models of sociology, which are subtypes of symbolic 
interactionism, and the existential and ethnomethodological 
models of sociology, which are subtypes of phenomenology 
(st. Clair, "Language"). 
Dramaturgical Model 
a. Social roles are created. 
b. Individual perform in roles and use scripts. 
c. Members are both audience and critic. 
d. stage fright can be enhanced. 
Labelling Model 
a. People share a common world of symbolism. 
b. Members are taught views of the world. 
c. Such teaching establishes norms. 
d. Norms enable an insider/outsider distinction. 
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Existential Model 
a. The world is without meaning. 
b. Belief systems are arbitrary. 
c. The world is full of alienation and insecurity. 
d. Conflict and negotiation are the norm. 
Ethnomethodological 
a. Behavior is justified; excuses are explained. 
b. Face games protect the member's identity. 
c. Relationship games for impression management. 
d. Members struggle for establishment of power. 
e. An inherent "right to control others" exists. 
f. Members have a need to re-affirm self-esteem. 
Not only do central metaphors determine in large part 
one's sociological models and how and what one views as 
coherent, but they also determine significant parts of one's 
vocabulary. st. Clair argues that "language is never 
neutral" (Social Metaphor, 41), and this lack of neutrality 
is proven when one examines one's lexicon, for it can 
quickly indicate the operational central metaphor and 
sociological model. For example, one who is using the 
central metaphor of chance will likely include in his or her 
lexicon many of the following expressions: 
maybe I'll get lucky, good luck, chances are, the 
odds are against it, let's take a chance, let the 
chips fall where they may, Lady Luck smiled on me, 
the Man upstairs likes me, you pays your money and 
you takes your chances, he lucked out, he lucked 
up, it's not my day 
Or, someone who is using the central metaphor of machine 
might have a lexicon which includes the following 
expressions: 
he's wired too tight, learn the nuts and bolts of 
it, get cranked up, get in gear, stay in gear, 
can't get out of low gear, missed a gear, in high 
gear, hit the brakes, a little rusty, in sync, 
ginning right along 
Warrants 
While one does not wear a lapel button announcing to 
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the world which central metaphor one is employing or which 
epistemological framework one is operating within, both are 
indicated implicitly in a multitude of ways, such as through 
body language, lexicon, and prosodic features of spoken 
language. From the beginning, this study has emphasized the 
explicit-implicit dynamic that involves the various elements 
of global coherence. This part of the study examines an 
element of global coherence that is a form of tacit 
knowledge and which is integral to the very notion of 
rhetoric. In classical rhetoric, this form of tacit 
knowledge was exemplified in the enthymeme, a truncated form 
of syllogism with one of the premises implied, and is, as 
Corbett puts it, "the instrument of deductive reasoning 
peculiar to the art of rhetoric" (74). But the minor or 
major premise of a syllogistic argument is not all that is 
implicit in the successful essay or composition. 
When one composes an essay, one does not normally state 
one's epistemological framework, nor the central metaphors 
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one lives by, although it is perfectly possible to do so. 
Likewise, one does not normally explain the sociological 
model one is operating within. Of course, one could inform 
one's audience that one is a strict empiricist who believes 
that life is best lived under the law of fang and claw 
(though this connection is not a necessary one), and that 
one role-plays and engages in the manipulation of symbols, 
both linguistic and otherwise, in an effort to "come out on 
top" in this "civil" contest of life in which only the 
fittest survive. And of course, one might inform one's 
audience of one's epistemological framework, choice of 
central metaphors, and sociological model in a genuine 
effort to establish rapport, but normally, all of this and 
much more is implied when one produces an essay or 
composition, and this tacit knowledge, essential for 
successful communication between the writer and the reader, 
may be captured in a single concept: warrants. 
In his The Uses of Argument, Stephen E. Toulmin argues 
against traditional symbolic logic as the truest form of 
argument. He raises the following questions, questions 
which bear directly on the notion of contextual salience: 
What things about the modes in which we 
assess arguments, the standards by reference to 
which we assess them and the manner in which we 
qualify our conclusions about them, are the same 
regardless of field (field-invariant), and which 
of them vary as we move from arguments in one 
field to arguments in another (field-dependent)? 
How far, for instance, can one compare the 
standards of argument relevant in a court of law 
with those relevant to a mathematical proof or a 
prediction about the composition of a tennis team? 
(11) 
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What Toulmin is addressing here when he distinguishes 
between "field-invariant" and "field-dependent" is the 
notion of context, specifically, the notion of implied 
context or background knowledge which the writer can safely 
assume forms an implicit "bridge" between him or her and the 
audience. The "standards of argument" may well differ from 
a court of law to a mathematical proof to predictions of who 
will and who will not make the tennis team. The standards 
will vary because the context varies. Indeed, even within 
argument types, e.g., within the field of law, the standards 
will vary, as tax lawyers learn very quickly when they seek 
to become trial lawyers. Thus, the notion of context is 
pivotal in the coherent argument, as it is in the coherent 
essay or composition. 
Significantly, much of what is contextually salient in 
a rhetorical situation is implicit. In his model of 
argumentation, Toulmin calls the implicit part of the 
background information which forms an implicit bridge 
between the rhetor and the audience the warrant. It might 
also be thought of as the implicit and necessary part of a 
writer's register. 
The concept of warrants in rhetoric entails many 
factors. When one considers writing in various disciplines, 
one notes that what is assumed for each discipline includes 
epistemological frame, arrangement, and lexicon. The writer 
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of the scientific paper may be wed to empiricism for his or 
her epistemological frame. Also, he or she may follow a 
specified arrangement such as observations, hypothesis, 
hypothesis testing, results, and conclusions, as well as be 
expected to employ a lexicon specific to the field. 
Moreover, an "objective" tone will be assumed, and the use 
of passive voice will be acceptable and perhaps encouraged. 
In like manner, the writer of the literary essay will most 
likely operate unconstrained by empiricism, have much more 
freedom of arrangement, but also be expected to use a 
lexicon specific to literary criticism. The "subjective" 
tone may be quite acceptable, even encouraged for the 
interpretive portion of the paper, and passive voice will, 
in all likelihood, be discouraged. 
Warrants, then, may vary from discipline to discipline, 
and when one writes in specific disciplines, one must 
acquaint oneself with the discipline's particular warrants 
and respect their bounds. If one uses too much warrant, 
i.e., if one assumes too much, one risks incoherence; if one 
uses too little warrant, i.e., if one assumes too little, 
one risks tedious repetition, much as one would if one were 
to avoid the use of pronouns and elect instead to name the 
proper noun at its every reference. In this latter case, 
warrants, in a sense, serve a shorthand function paralleling 
that of the pronoun in the linguistic perspective of global 
coherence. 
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Moreover, and equally important, the appropriate 
warrant enables one physician to pick up a journal and read 
with confidence and efficiency an article written by another 
physician, or a biologist to read with confidence and 
efficiency an article written by another biologist, or a 
social worker to read with confidence and efficiency an 
article written by another social worker. Warrants are 
determined by a "match" at various levels of rhetoric: from 
a narrow match for writing done within particular 
disciplines by members of the discipline for members of the 
discipline, to a broad match when one writes for members of 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the "universal 
audience" (30-35). Once the warrant has been established, 
then such rhetorical features as arrangement, lexicon, and 
tone follow by mutual assent between writer and audience. 
Contextually Salient Elements of Global Coherence 
The contextually salient perspective of global 
coherence is culturally related; thus, it often seems to be 
omnipresent and ubiquitous. However, it is often the most 
implicit aspect of global coherence. The contextually 
salient perspective seldom manifests itself explicitly or 
directly through language meant to be understood at the 
literal level, as in the linguistic and cognitive 
perspectives, but rather in language meant to be understood 
at the interpretive level in the form of such key components 
of a composition as lexicon, grammatical structure (e.g., 
voice and nominalizations, etc.), rhetorical pattern of 
sentences (e.g., balanced, loose, or periodic), thesis 
placement, and prevalence of particular central cognitive 
processes (often resulting in emphasis on a particular 
arrangement or pattern of thought). 
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What follows is a summary listing of contextually 
salient elements of global coherence. Just as the listing 
of the cognitive elements of global coherence was not meant 
to be exhaustive, neither is this list meant to be 
exhaustive. Rather, it is offered in an attempt to draw 
appropriate attention to largely implicit elements of a text 
which traditionally have been overlooked or pointedly 
excluded. We might recall that Halliday and Hasan seem to 
give equal status to both register and cohesion, the latter 
being the focus of their study. Indeed, according to 
Halliday and Hasan, "texture" (global coherence) is achieved 
through the mutually complementary relationship of 
"register" and "cohesion" (23). As noted above, the concept 
of warrants and all it entails may be regarded as the 
implicit and necessary part of a writer's register. 
Halliday and Hasan define register as "the set of 
meanings, the configuration of semantic patterns, that are 
typically drawn upon under the specified conditions, along 
with the words and structures that are used in the 
realization of the meanings" (23). Halliday and Hasan thus 
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acknowledge the essential nature of extra-textual elements 
in order for a text to evince global coherence, but they 
limit their work to the surface language of a text, 
deliberately and explicitly excluding register, and thus 
warrants, from their study of cohesion in English. 
Gutwinski goes even further with regard to 
extra-textual elements of global cohesion. As noted in 
chapter two (p. 47), he believes coherence to be 
unanalyzable in the linguistic sense because it deals with 
phenomena which "cannot be treated on a single level of 
analysis and some which are not open to linguistic analysis 
at all" (26). Such a position, which allows only for 
empirical data, bespeaks of the epistemological framework 
Naturwissenschaften, and is an exclusionary one which does 
not begin to address the complex and multi-layered elements 
which function to cohere an essay or composition. 
The following list, then, is an attempt to account for 
at least some of the major elements of global coherence in 
the contextually salient perspective; these elements, though 
implicit, are nonetheless essential. Indeed, they may be 
the most pervasive and powerful of all the elements of 
global coherence, for they deal not only with 
epistemological frameworks, but also with one's values and 
belief systems. 
Examples of Epistemological Frames 
Geisteswissenschaften: the inclusive frame which 
utilizes both intangible and 
tangible data 
133 
Naturwissenschaften: the exclusive frame which utilizes 
only tangible data 
Examples of Central Metaphors 
Cosmos: the metaphor which emphasizes the harmony, 
order, and balance exhibited in the universe 
Growth: the metaphor which views the good in terms such 
as expansion or increasing consumption 
Jungle: the metaphor which views life as the survival 
of the fittest 
Chance: the metaphor which emphasizes the randomness 
and unpredictability of life 
Fate: the metaphor which views life's events as 
foreordained 
Journey: the metaphor which likens life to a trip 
having a definite beginning, interim 
passage(s), and destination 
The Establishment: the metaphor which acknowledges a 
controling status quo 
Money: the metaphor that life has a cash nexus and 
everything is viewed in relation to this nexus 
Machine: the metaphor that life is mechanistic, and 
accordingly is analyzable and predictable 
stage: the metaphor that life is drama and requires 
various roles to be played 










prevalence of particular central cognitive processes 
rhetorical pattern of sentences 
tone 
An Explicit-Implicit Continuum 
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Our treatment of the linguistic perspective of global 






It was noted that because of the mandatory explicitness 
of the linguistic elements of global coherence, all four 
categories--repetition, anaphora, cataphora, and ellipsis--
are located at the explicit end of the continuum, but 
because ellipsis has an implicit component, it is also 
located at the implicit end of the continuum. 
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It was also noted that unlike the linguistic elements 
of global coherence, which always have a mandatory, explicit 
component manifested in the text through and by language 
expressly for co-referential purposes, the cognitive 
elements of global coherence are often manifested in a 
liminal manner and serve as a threshold at which the 
explicit-implicit distinction blurs. consequently, the 
explicit-implicit continuum with elements from both the 













The central cognitive processes were located at the 
limen position of the continuum because of the variable 
nature of their overt markers; at times, their overt markers 
are necessary, but often they are optional, depending on the 
rhetorical situation. NOw, it is necessary to locate the 
elements of the contextually salient perspective of global 
coherence on the explicit-implicit continuum. 
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The overwhelming use of language is not empirical 
reference, i.e., reference exclusively to the empirical 
here-and-nowi rather, most language use is modal reference, 
i.e., reference to all situations and circumstances not in 
the empirical here-and-now. Just as the referents of this 
modal use of language are not located in the here-and-now, 
the contextually salient elements of global coherence are 
not located within the text. Accordingly, one can posit an 
















This schema is far from complete, but it offers a set 
of elements from three different perspectives that may serve 
as a manageable framework within which one can better 
analyze and teach global coherence. The schema suggests a 
complex and multi-layered continuum of elements which 
function to globally cohere an essay or composition. While 
137 
this continuum reflects an explicit-implicit dynamic, it 
does not represent a configuration which integrates the 
three global perspectives and their respective elements. 
In the next, and concluding, chapter of this study, such a 
configuration is offered, as well as implications for 
teaching student writers to produce globally coherent 
compositions. 
Works cited 
bear. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978. 
138 
Brown, Richard. A Poetics for Sociology: Towards a Logic of 
Discovery for the Human Sciences. Boston: Cambridge U 
P, 1979. 
Corbett, Edward. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 
New York: Oxford U P, 1971. 
Corder, Jim, and John Ruszkiewicz. Handbook of Current 
English. Glenview IL: Scott, Foresman, 1985. 
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Essay of Philosophy. Trans. Stephen 
Emery & William Emery. NY: AMS Press, 1985. 
Introduction to the Human Sciences. Ed. & Trans. 
Ramon Betanzos. Detroit: Wayne state U P, 1988. 
Fodor, Jerry. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge MA: MIT P, 
1983. 
Glass, Arnold, Keith Holyoak, and John Santa. Cognition. 
Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979. 
Gutwinski, Waldemar. Cohesion in Literary Texts. The 
Hague: Mouton, 1976. 
Hairston, Maxine, and John Ruszkiewicz. The Scott, Foresman 
Handbook for writers. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. 
Halliday, M. A. K., and R. Hasan. Cohesion in English. 
London: Longman, 1976. 
Hirsch, E. D., Jr. "Objective Interpretation." critical 
Theory Since Plato. Ed. Hazard Adams. San Diego CA: 
HBJ, 1971. 1176-94. 
Hodges, John, and Mary Whitten. Harbrace college Handbook. 
New York: HBJ, 1977. 
Holy Bible. Ed. C. I. Scofield. New York: Oxford U P, 
1967. 
Jones, Roger. Physics as Metaphor. New York: Meridian, 
1982. 
Kaplan, Robert. "Cultural Thought Patterns in 
Inter-Cultural Education." Readings on English as a 
Second Language. Ed. Kenneth Croft. Cambridge MA: 
Winthrop, 1980. 399-418. 
Knoblauch, C. H., and Lil Brannon. 
and the Teaching of Writing. 
Boynton/Cook, 1984. 
Rhetorical Traditions 
Upper Montclair NJ: 
Lakoff, George. "A Figure of Thought." Metaphor and 
Symbolic Activity 3 (1985-86): 215-25. 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. 
Chicago: U Chigago P, 1980. 
139 
McCrimmon, James. writing with a Purpose. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1974. 
metaphor. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978. 
Perelman, C., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric. 
Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame 
IN: U Notre Dame P, 1971. 
Richards, I. A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York: 
Oxford U P, 1936. 
st. Clair, Robert N. "Language and the Social Construction 
of Reality." Language Science 4 (1982): 211-36. 
social Metaphor: Essays in structural Epistemology. 
Forthcoming. 
stewart, Donald. The Versatile writer. Lexington: D. C. 
Heath, 1986. 
Toulmin, Stephen. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge ENG: 
Cambridge U P, 1958. 




This study in global coherence for the teacher of 
composition began with the following two passages from 
classical rhetoric's On the Sublime. Longinus wrote ". 
we see skill in invention, and due order and arrangement of 
matter, emerging as the hard-won result not of one thing nor 
of two, but of the whole texture of the composition" (43). 
He continued: 
Now, there inhere in all things by nature 
certain constituents which are part and parcel of 
their substance. It must needs be, therefore, 
that we shall find one source of the sublime in 
the systematic selection of the most important 
elements, and the power of forming, by their 
mutual combination, what may be called one body. 
(69) 
I have sought to identify these "most important 
elements" so that teachers of composition, and particularly 
their students, will have a better idea of what a coherent 
essay or composition entails. Perhaps more importantly, 
teachers and students in composition clas~es may also have a 
better idea of why a particular paper fails to cohere and 
what might be done to remedy the lack of coherence. 
Toward this end, three lines of inquiry were followed: 
a linguistic perspective, a cognitive perspective, and a 
contextually salient perspective. The linguistic 
perspective was investigated first, for, as a review of 
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college handbooks revealed, what attention had been given 
the notion of coherence was given principally at the 
sentence level and restricted to the surface language of the 
sentence. 
Three major works dealing with coherence from a 
linguistic perspective were analyzed: Halliday and Hasan's 
Cohesion in English, Gutwinski's Cohesion in Literary Texts, 
and Markels' A New Perspective in Cohesion in Expository 
Paragraphs. Excepting a portion of Markels' work, the 
analysis revealed a tendency to exclude extra-textual 
aspects of discourse. 
The analysis of these works also resulted in the 
identification of linguistic elements of global coherence 
and their location along an explicit-implicit continuum. 
These linguistic elements serve a co-reference function, 
constitute sets with a relatively small number of words in a 
given text, occur frequently, and have a mandatory 
explicitness so that they can enable logical identity and 
consistency of reference. These elements are shown on the 







The second line of inquiry, that of the cognitive 
perspective, investigated the roles of the umbrella concepts 
of the given/new relationship, Gestalt, and central 
cognitive processes. The central cognitive processes were 
seen as serving a vital and dual role in effecting global 
coherence, for they serve not only as "pathways" along which 
humans experience outer and inner reality, but also as the 
"nuts and bolts" of thought. They thus function to generate 
thoughts as well as to organize them. These central 
cognitive processes were demonstrated to be optional in many 
instances, and thus they are located at the limen along the 












The third line of inquiry, that of contextual salience, 
explored the roles of epistemological frames, central 
metaphors, sociological models, and warrants as they serve 
to effect the global coherence of an essay or composition. 
It was found that much of the function of these elements is 
extra-textual and implicit, and that much of the language 
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used to signify them is used at the interpretive level. 
These elements are pervasive and ubiquitous. Below, the 
contextually salient elements are located along the 
explicit-implicit continuum in relation to the elements of 
















The elements listed above are not intended to be 
inclusive; rather, they are meant to break new ground in the 
study of coherence and to redistribute the burden of 
coherence from the sentence level and from the surface 
language of the text to a more inclusive and realistic 
tri-partite focus. In this sense, then, they may be thought 
of as the "certain constituents" to which Longinus was 
referring when he wrote " ... there inhere in all things by 
nature certain constituents which are part and parcel of 
their substance" (69). 
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All three sets of global elements--linguistic, 
cognitive, and contextually salient--interrelate in 
distinctive ways to achieve textual coherence. The 
linguistic elements create an explicit and consistent thread 
of co-reference, thus ensuring "the most fundamental 
principle of language: the normative principle of logical 
identity" (Waldron 197). This set of cohering elements 
performs the crucial role of maintaining the integrity of 
the nucleus of natural language logic, a nucleus which 
consists of logical identity and co-reference. 
The cognitive elements encompass this nucleus of 
logical identity and co-reference and enable the generation 
and organization of content around and about it. These 
elements cross all registers and semantic domains and are 
universal for all humans. Significantly, central cognitive 
processes are located at the limen of explicitness-
implicitness, and their life on the boundary allows them to 
shift from the explicit to the implicit as linguistic 
convention or concerns of salience dictate. 
The contextually salient elements encompass the 
cognitive elements as well as the linguistic elements and 
establish the expectations and constraints of the rhetorical 
situation. These elements are not only the most implicit, 
but also the most pervasive, the most ubiquitous, and the 
most circumscribing. 
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A Visual Metaphor of Global Coherence 
The visual metaphor below offers another way of viewing 
the elements of global coherence and their interrelationships. 
contextually Salient Perspective 
epistemological frames most implicit 
central metaphors most circumscribing 
sociological models most pervasive 
warrants establish expectations 








located at the explicit-implicit limen 
cross all domains and registers 
universal for all humans 
effect both invention and arrangement 
Linguistic Perspective 
repetitiOn} most explicit 
anaphora effect reference, co-reference, and 
cataphora logical identity, thus comprising 
ellipsis the nucleus of natural language logic 
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No metaphor is completely descriptive. The metaphor 
offered above, adapted from Niels Bohr's model of the atom, 
does not capture the pervasiveness of contextual salience. 
In order for it to do so, the model would have to be three 
dimensional with fibers or force fields of a constraining 
nature extending from it and throughout the three "levels." 
Nonetheless, this metaphor captures several vital aspects of 
the global perspectives. 
For instance, the overarching nature of contextual 
salience is accurately represented, as is the nucleus of 
natural language logic, the integrity of which is maintained 
by the linguistic level. Too, the visual metaphor aptly 
places the cognitive level, which is liminal regarding 
explicit and implicit properties, between the most explicit 
level, the linguistic level, and the most implicit level, 
the contextual salience level. 
Significantly, the three "concentric" levels of the 
visual metaphor comprise a continuum of more-or-less 
discrete force fields potentially in contact with any other 
force field on any level, thus simulating the property of 
parallel distributed processing. 
Finally, instead of confining the focus of coherence to 
the surface of a text at sentence level, this visual 
metaphor enables one to comprehend better the multi-layered 




This approach to global coherence offers the teacher of 
composition distinct advantages over the conventional 
accounts grounded principally in linguistic description of 
the surface language of a text at the sentence level. Seven 
major advantages of this approach are that it 
• allows for a full recognition of the 
parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts relationship 
• relates the parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts aspects 
to bottom up and top down processing 
• emphasizes the connections among rhetoric, the "real 
world," and the elements of global coherence 
• addresses both the linear and non-linear aspects of 
global coherence and text production 
• demonstrates that the abbreviation "coh" is 
insufficient to indicate problems in coherence 
• shows how central cognitive processes effect both 
invention and arrangement 
• provides the basis for determining the order in which 
the global perspectives may be taught. 
The first advantage of this approach is it allows for a 
full recognition of the parts-to-whole a~d whole-to-parts 
relationship. Global coherence was defined as the 
comprehensive, systematic connection of constitutive 
elements of a text of logical discourse, with a consistent 
emphasis on the totality of the text and on the 
interrelatedness of its constituents (chapter I, p. 2). Two 
significant notions are couched in this definition: the 
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notion of parts, i. e., the "constituents," and the notion 
of whole, Le., the "totality of the text." The 
parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts relationships are depicted 
in both the explicit-implicit continuum and the visual 
metaphor. The former offers constitutive elements along an 
explicit-implicit continuum; these constitutive elements 
comprise a totality resulting in the global coherence of an 
essay or composition. Similarly, the visual metaphor offers 
a totality of constitutive elements in the form of the 
global perspectives--the linguistic, cognitive, and 
contextually salient perspectives. In both the explicit-
implicit continuum and the visual metaphor, as well as in 
the definition of global coherence, the parts-to-whole and 
whole-to-parts relationships evince themselves as integral 
to an understanding of global coherence. It follows, then, 
that an acute awareness of this relationship ought to be 
central to one's pedagogy in the composition class. 
The second advantage of this approach is it relates the 
parts-to-whole and whole-to-parts aspects of global 
coherence to bottom up and top down processing. Any 
approach toward coherence that focuses on one particular 
language level, as in the Harbrace College Handbook with its 
focus on the sentence level, or on one discourse level, as 
in McCrimmon's Writing with a Purpose with its focus on the 
paragraph, does not go far enough. Instead, one needs an 
approach which emphasizes the parts-to-whole and the 
whole-to-parts relationships. 
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If the composition teacher facilitates bottom up 
processing of global elements in conjunction with top down 
processing, i.e., if the student writer is encouraged to see 
"the big picture" of the composition assignment, of what 
sort of composition or essay might result, while also being 
encouraged to see how the global elements may combine to 
cohere a text, then that student's prospects for a 
successful paper are enhanced. Hence, the student writer 
would be actively engaged in dual tasks. An approach 
incorporating the parts-to-whole/whole-to-parts dynamic also 
meshes with recent studies in learning theory which suggest 
that humans as individuals have different cognitive styles. 
Some writers tend to begin a composition with "the big 
picture" and then "flesh it out," while others begin with 
several small observations and details and then build upon 
them until a coherent composition emerges. 
The third advantage of this approach is its emphasis on 
the connections among rhetoric, the "real world," and the 
elements of global coherence. This emphasis stems from the 
tri-partite nature of the approach, and that a significant 
portion of the elements effecting global coherence are 
extra-textual or implied. Thus, it is incumbent upon the 
composition teacher to ensure that student writers 
understand the significance, both rhetorical and "real 
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world," of global elements such as warrants, central 
metaphors, sociological models, and perhaps even 
epistemological frames. This does not mean, of course, that 
a composition course be turned into miniature psycho- and 
sociolinguistic courses, but this does mean that these 
global elements need to be expressed in language appropriate 
to the course level, for often they are crucial to top-down 
or whole-to-parts processing. And of course, these elements 
are part-and-parcel to a cogent understanding of the 
rhetorical situation. 
The fourth advantage of this approach is it addresses 
both the linear and non-linear aspects of global coherence 
and text production. If the cognitive perspective, and 
particularly if the contextually salient perspective, is 
accepted, then a pedagogical implication concerning 
linearity emerges: many of the cohering elements of 
successful composing are not linear. Composition teachers 
must address this circumstance. Compositionalists must 
engage student writers in non-linear thought, must stimulate 
non-linear thought, and then face the larger challenge of 
coaching and coaxing student writers into articulating their 
non-linear thought into linear Edited American English. 
Here a question about the traditional college essay arises, 
however. will the future college essay be solely one of 
linear Edited American English, or will it take the form of 
a multi-media presentation saved on a computer disk? 
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Perhaps traditionalists need not be too alarmed, though, for 
even if the future holds such a college essay, they can rest 
fairly secure that the multi-media essay will require an 
ample amount of linear articulation. 
The fifth advantage of this approach is it demonstrates 
that the abbreviation "cohn is insufficient to indicate 
problems in coherence. If one agrees that many elements, 
such as those from the linguistic, cognitive, and 
contextually salient perspectives, combine to cohere an 
essay or composition, one might also raise the following 
question: before a composition teacher responds to a problem 
of coherence in a student paper by writing "cohn on the 
paper, ought not that composition teacher first discern the 
nature of the incoherence and be prepared to offer a 
corrective tactic or strategy to the student writer apropos 
the error? A related question is, if the linguistic 
elements of global coherence deal mostly with the 
maintenance of identity, if central cognitive processes deal 
mostly with the generation and organization of content, and 
if contextually salient elements deal mostly with 
expectations and constraints regarding lexicon, arrangement, 
tone, and so forth, then will a simple "cohn suffice if a 
student writer has a problem in anyone of these kinds of 
cohering elements? Put another way, should a composition 
teacher be more specific with regard to symbols used to mark 
problems in coherence? 
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The sixth advantage of this study is it shows how 
central cognitive processes effect both invention and 
arrangement. Traditionally, words such as however, although, 
and therefore have been viewed as conjunctive adverbs or 
subordinate conjunctions, depending on whether they relate 
main clauses or subordinate clauses. From a purely 
grammatical or surface language view, this may be 
acceptable, but this position overlooks the shared nature of 
all such transition words. Such words not only bridge, but 
actually are channels or kinds of thought as the section on 
central cognitive processes indicates (chapter III, pp. 87-
102). Central cognitive processes not only enable one to 
generate thoughts, but also to organize them. Because of 
this double articulation, they are arguably the best 
examples illustrating the fluid relationship between 
invention and arrangement. Ought they not, then, receive 
special emphasis in the teaching of both invention and 
arrangement of a composition? 
The seventh advantage of this approach is it provides 
the basis for determining the order in which the global 
perspectives may be taught. Should the llnguistic, 
cognitive, and contextually salient perspectives be taught 
collectively? Or, perhaps, should only the cognitive and 
contextually salient perspectives be taught, and student 
writers having serious problems with the elements of the 
linguistic perspective be sent to remediation? with the 
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latter view, would it be good to teach the contextually 
salient view first by introducing its elements and the 
expectations and constraints they signify? As noted 
earlier, these could be taught through the rhetorical 
situation, through warrants, and through an introduction to 
the levels of language use. Then, central cognitive 
processes could be taught along with their dual role of 
generating and organizing content vis-a-vis the constraints 
and expectations of the contextually salient elements. The 
composition teacher could then monitor for problems with the 
linguistic elements. 
Sygyzy 
As far as is known, no other beings in the cosmos have 
been accorded the scope and degree of spoken ability that 
humans have, yet as wonderful as speech is, it alone would 
not have taken humans very far from the cave. written 
language, however, with its ability to hypostasize thought, 
thus enabling permanent records, reflection, and extended 
discourse capable of revision, has exposed humans to 
seemingly infinite frontiers within the human psyche, and 
outside it, to the far, unfathomable reaches of space. 
Surely, then, to fashion coherent, extended, written 
discourse for a specific purpose to a specific audience 
regarding a specific occasion--that is, to fashion a 
successful essay or composition--is to participate in a 
uniquely human endeavor. 
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In the discipline of astronomy, one learns of a 
phenomenon called syzygy. Syzygy is a natural alignment of 
elements--three celestial bodies--but it is not a continuous 
alignment, and it occurs only when certain conditions and 
perspectives coalesce; similarly, one may envision a kind of 
syzygy in the coalescing of conditions and perspectives when 
the writer successfully aligns the "certain constituents" of 
the three global perspectives which are "part and parcel" of 
a globally coherent essay or composition. These 
constituents are myriad, intricate, and amazingly inter-
woven, yet if the student writer can learn how to align the 
perspectives and coalesce their elements into a successful 
essay or composition, then he or she may well.experience a 
sense of the sublime which Longinus extolls. It is my hope 
that this study will in some way help the teacher of 
composition guide his or her students in the uniquely human 
endeavor of generating successful essays. 
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APPENDIX I 
Halliday and Hasan argue in Cohesion in English that 
the cohering operations of co-reference, substitution, 
ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion are 
non-structural. This study in global coherence, however, 
argues that co-reference and ellipsis are forms of 
sUbstitution and that sUbstitution is structural in nature. 
Details of this argument follow: fundamental to Halliday and 
Hasan's approach to textual analysis is the notion of the 
tie, which they define as "a single instance of cohesion, a 
term for one occurrence of a pair of cohesively related 
items" (5). An example is "the relation between them and 
six cooking apples" in the following: 
[2:1] Wash and core six cooking apples. 
Put them into a fireproof dish. 
A tie, then, is "best interpreted as a RELATION between 
. two elements," one of which presupposes the other; a 
tie is "also DIRECTIONAL," in that it is anaphoric 
"presupposed element preceding") or cataphoric ("presupposed 
element following") (329). Ties may be "IMMEDIATE," 
"MEDIATED," or "REMOTE" as the following passage 
illustrates: 
[2: 2] The last word ended in a long bleat, so 
like a sheep that Alice quite started 
(1). She looked at the Queen, who 
seemed to have suddenly wrapped herself 
up in wool (2). Alice rubbed her eyes, 
and looked again (3). She couldn't make 
out what had happened at all (4). Was 
she in a shop (5)? And was that 
really--was it really a sheep that was 
sitting on the other side of the counter 
(6)? Rub as she would, she could make 
nothing more of it (7). (qtd. in 
Halliday & Hasan 330) 
Because the she in sentence (2) refers to Alice in 
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sentence (1), and the two sentences are contiguous, the tie 
is immediate. If the ties occur in three or more contiguous 
sentences, then the ties are "MEDIATED," as for the she in 
(5) and Alice in (3); the she in (4) mediates because it, 
too, like the she in (5), presupposes Alice in (3). If a 
tie exists across a number of sentences with no mediated 
ties in the intervening sentences, then the tie is "REMOTE," 
as for Rub as she would in (7) and Alice rubbed her eyes in 
(3) • 
In order for one to make sense of Rub as she would, one 
has to refer back across intervening, non-mediating 
sentences to Alice rubbed her eyes in (3) (Halliday & Hasan 
330-31) . 
Cohesive ties are of five types, reflecting the five 
sub-categories of cohesion: co-reference, .substitution, 
ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion (4). 
Halliday and Hasan treat the cohesive tie of 
co-reference as a "semantic," not a "grammatical," relation 
and view it as prior to the other types of cohesive ties 
(most probably because they consider it a non-structural 
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form of cohesion). Co-reference is viewed directionally and 
semantically. 
Co-reference viewed directionally is of two broad 
categories: exophoric and endophoric. 
Exophoric co-reference deals with co-reference outside 
the text, i.e., to elements of the register, and thus is 
considered "situational" co-reference. Halliday and Hasan, 
drawing from Bernstein, illustrate exophoric co-reference 
with the following example: 
[2:3] They're playing football and he kicks it 
and it goes through there it breaks the 
window and they're looking at it and he 
comes out and shouts at them because 
they've broken it so they run away and 
then she looks out and she tells them 
off. (qtd. in Halliday & Hasan 35) 
In order for this passage to "make sense," one must 
have information concerning the referents of the pronouns, 
i.e., who they are, and perhaps what their roles are in the 
context of the passage (35). Significantly for 
rhetoricians, Halliday and Hasan exclude exophoric reference 
from their study of cohesion in English. 
Endophoric co-reference deals with co-reference between 
items in a text and is considered "textual" co-reference. 
Endophoric co-reference is the co-reference of primary 
concern for Halliday and Hasan. Endophoric co-reference 
subdivides into anaphoric and cataphoric co-reference, with 
anaphoric referring back to an element located earlier in 
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the text and cataphoric referring forward to an element in 




Jon swims very well; he swam the English Channel. 
cataphoric co-reference 
What I am going to say will interest you 
immensely. 
Susan has decided to study medicine in Tibet. 
Co-reference viewed semantically is of three types: 
personal, demonstrative, and comparative. Personal 
co-reference is "by means of function in the speech 






I bought a new car yesterday. (pronoun) 
(One can also argue that I is substituting for a 
proper noun which lies outside the text, is 
therefore exophoric (cf. [2:3], not endophoric, 
and if one were to follow Halliday and Hasan's 
logic, the use of I would then not be textual. 
However, the definition of global coherence 
encompasses exophoric co-reference. Regardless of 
the directionality, it is argued here that the use 
of I in this sentence is an example of 
substitution.) 
The salesman gave me a good deal. (pronoun) 
(Again, the pronoun me sUbstitutes for a 
proper noun.) 
Now the car is mine. (determiner) 
(Here, mine sUbstitutes for the noun phrase 
my car.) 
Now my bank account is nearly empty. (determiner) 
(For this last sentence, one can argue that 
my functions as a modifier in a noun 
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phrase, not as a co-referent. Thus far, 
the uses of Halliday and Hasan's semantic 
co-reference are primarily that of 
substitution.) 
Halliday and Hasan's second type of co-reference, 
demonstrative co-reference, is "essentially a form of verbal 
pointing" (deixis) according to proximity (57), and is 
realized in words such as this/these, here (near), 
that/those, there, then (far), and the definite article the. 
(Halliday and Hasan argue that the should be included with 
the deictic words because the is a reduced form of that, and 
the, while making its referent definite, may refer to 
something in the register--exophorically--and thus qualifies 
as cohesive. It should be noted, however, that the focus of 
Halliday and Hasan throughout their book is on endophoric 
co-reference; thus, inclusion of the at the same status as 
the other deictic words because of an exophoric property is 
debatable.) 




I like the lions, and I like the polar bears. 
These are my favorites (60). 
We're going to the opera tonight. This'll be our 
first outing for months (60). 
(One can argue that in [2:10], These is 
either a truncated or elliptical 
construction substituting for the noun 
phrase these animals, and that in [2:11], 
This sUbstitutes for the noun phrase our 
going.) 
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Halliday and Hasan state that what "probably accounts 
for the majority of all instances" of demonstrative 
co-reference is extended co-reference, in which the 
demonstrative refers to a process or situation: 
[2:12] They broke a Chinese vase. 
That was very careless. (66) 
That refers to the process involved which 
resulted in the breaking of the vases. 
(One can argue that That is actually 
another example of sUbstitution: That = the 
breaking of the vase.) 
Halliday and Hasan's third type of co-reference, 
comparative co-reference, is of two kinds, general and 
particular. General comparative co-reference is based on 
the notions that "likeness is a referential property," and a 
"thing cannot just be 'like'; it must be 'like something'" 
(18). The comparison "may be in the situation or in the 
text," it may be anaphoric and cataphoric, and it may be 
structural or non-structural, and if it is non-structural 
and in the text, then it is cohesive (78). (1 argue in 
chapter three that the latitude of situations and conditions 
under which comparison operates, along with other reasons, 
makes it a central cognitive process and is not a form of 
co-reference.) 
Examples of anaphoric and cataphoric general 
comparative co-reference are, respectively, the following: 




(One can argue that different is a 
truncated or elliptical form of the phrase 
different than Sam, and, in turn, that this 
phrase is a truncated form of the 
underlying clause a person who differs from 
Sam, which modifies someone. Thus, 
different is not used as co-reference, but 
is used to indicate comparison, which is 
treated in the cognitive perspective of 
global coherence.) 
She's a different breed than the one we had 
before. 
(Here, one can again argue that different 
than is not used as co-reference, but is 
used to indicate comparison, which is 
treated as a central cognitive process in 
the cognitive perspective in chapter three 
of this study.) 
Additionally, Halliday and Hasan tell us, "the 
comparison may be internal--the likeness expressed as mutual 
likeness without a referent appearing as a distinct entity" 




Most people have the same breakfast every day. 
(meaning 'the same as every other day') (80) 
The candidates gave three similar answers. 
(meaning 'similar to each other') (80) 
All parties showed an identical reaction to the 
news. (meaning 'reacted in the same way as each 
other') (80) 
(In each of these cases, one can argue that 
the words the same as, similar, and 
identical principally indicate comparison, 
a central cognitive process, and not 
co-reference, i.e., none of the expressions 
share referents, but they indicate 
referents which share commonalities.) 
Particular comparative co-reference "expresses 





We don't need any more mistakes. 
The hare ran faster. 
The sun shines brighter. 
163 
(One can make two additional arguments 
here: 1) each of these examples have 
elliptical constructions, e.g., [2:18] "We 
don't need any more mistakes (than we 
already have)" or [2:19] "The hare ran 
faster (than the tortoise) "; 
2) comparison, not co-reference, is 
indicated by comparative forms more and 
-ere ) 
Curiously, Halliday and Hasan end their discussion of 
co-reference with the statement that "the different forms of 
cohesion are nowhere sharply set apart one from another" 
(87) • 
In sum, from the examples above, one can make two 
observations. First, much of co-reference can be seen as a 
form of sUbstitution. Second, those examples of 
co-reference which are not sUbstitution can be seen as forms 
of comparison, a central cognitive process. Such 
recategorization simplifies the linguistic perspective of 
global coherence. 
Halliday and Hasan's second sUb-category of cohesion is 
sUbstitution. Halliday and Hasan argue that sUbstitution is 
a relation between linguistic items, such as words 
or phrases; whereas co-reference is a relation 
between meanings. . . . co-reference is a relation 
on the semantic level, whereas sUbstitution is a 
relation on the . . . level of grammar and 
vocabulary. (89) 
(They add that ellipsis "can be defined as 
sUbstitution by zero . . . but the mechanisms 
involved in the two [substitution and ellipsis] 
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are rather different, • • . and in the case of 
ellipsis, fairly complex" [88-89].) 




John has moved to a new house. 
He had it built last year. (54) 
Who are those colourful characters? 
Those must be the presidential guards. (63) 
The little dog barked as noisily as the big one. 
(82) 




My axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one. 
(89 ) 
What kind of engines do you want? 
Ones with whistles, or ones without? (92) 
These grapefruit smell more bitter than the last 
ones we had. (109) 
(Halliday and Hasan argue that ones is an 
example of sUbstitution if the grapefruit also 
taste more bitter, but if they taste the same, 
then ones is an example of co-reference, not 
substitution.) 
Although Halliday and Hasan argue co-reference occurs 
at the "semantic level," and that sUbstitution occurs at the 
level of "grammar" and "vocabulary," when one examines their 
examples, one finds the distinction to be nebulous, for each 
of their co-reference examples, [2:21] and [2:22], and their 
sUbstitution example, [2:25], indicate the same referent; 
and their co-reference example, [2:23], and each of their 
sUbstitution examples, [2:24] and [2:26], indicate different 
referents. What one does find in common for all examples is 
that SUbstitution of a pro-form occurs. Thus, if one omits 
the co-reference/ SUbstitution distinction (or the 
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semantic/grammatical distinction), one can avoid altogether 
the sort of puzzling, "smell" vs. "taste" contretemps 
presented by the grapefruit example [2:25]. 
substitution is of three types: nominal, verbal, and 
clausal. Nominal sUbstitution uses the words one, ones, or 
same; verbal sUbstitution uses the word do; and clausal 
sUbstitution uses the words so or not. These word lists are 
virtually inclusive, with only a few exceptions: the 
expressions do so, and do the same, about which there is 
some "indeterminacy," and general words such as thing, 
"where sUbstitution shades into lexical cohesion" (91). 
Examples of nominal sUbstitution are found in [2:24], 
[2:25], and [2:26] above. 




. . . the words did not come the same as they 
used to do. (substitution for come) (112) 
I don't know the meaning of half those long 
words, and, what's more, I don't believe you 
do either! 
(substitution for know the meaning of half those 
long words) (112) 
Halliday and Hasan note that for do substitution, "the 
contrastive element which provides the context for the 
sUbstitution is located within the same clause," as in 
[2:27] and [2:28] above, unlike in clausal sUbstitution 
(below), in which "the clause is presupposed, and the 
contrasting element is outside the clause" (130). 
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Clausal sUbstitution occurs in the environment of 
hypotaxis, i.e., one clause depends on another semantically, 
but not through structural embedding (136). Examples of 





Is there going to be an earthquake? 
It says so. (so sUbstitutes for the entire 
clause there is qoinq to be an earthquake, with 
says serving as the contrastive environment) 
(130) 
(reported clause) 
' ... if you've seen them so often, of course you 
know what they're like.' 
'I believe so,' Alice replied thoughtfully. (131) 
(conditional clause) 
Everyone seems to think he's guilty. If so, no 
doubt he'll offer to resign. (134) 
(modalized clause) 
'Oh, I beg your pardon!' cried Alice hastily, 
afraid that she had hurt the poor animal's 
feelings. 'I quite forgot you didn't like cats.' 
'Not like cats!' cried the Mouse, in a shrill, 
passionate voice. 'Would you like cats if you 
were me?' 
'Well, perhaps not,' said Alice in a soothing 
tone: . . . (134) 
Lastly, regarding the use of not, Halliday and Hasan 
relate that "the negative form of the clausal sUbstitute is 
not" (133), as in the following example: 
[2:33] Has everyone gone home? I hope not. (133) 
Halliday and Hasan's treatment of sUbstitution not only 
offers numerous examples illustrating how it enables 
cohesive ties in texts, but it also delineates kinds of 
substitution--nominal, verbal, and clausal, and in their 
contrast of verbal and clausal substitution, they draw 
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attention to the hypotactic environment, an environment 
which accounts for inter-clausal cohesive ties. 
Ellipsis is the third major sub-category of cohesion in 
Halliday and Hasan's schema, and although they state that 
"ellipsis is simply 'substitution by zero,'" they argue that 
for their purposes, it is "more helpful to treat the two 
[substitution and ellipsis] separately" because "they are 
two different kinds of structural mechanism, and hence show 
rather different patterns" (142). (It is interesting to 
note what may be some inconsistency on Halliday and Hasan's 
part in their using a structural property, i.e., "kinds of 
structural mechanism," to justify their treatment of 
ellipsis, while they continue to categorize ellipsis as 
"non-structural.") 
Halliday and Hasan seem a bit uncertain as to how to 
justify their assigning ellipsis unto its own category, for 
in one sentence they write "we can take as a general guide 
the notion that ellipsis occurs when something that is 
structurally necessary is left unsaid," and in the very next 
sentence they state "that the essential characteristic of 
ellipsis is that something which is present in the selection 
of underlying ('systemic') option is omitted in the 
structure--whether or not the resulting structure is in 
itself 'incomplete'" (144). Then, by way of summary, they 
state again that 
The difference between substitution and ellipsis is 
that in the former a sUbstitution counter occurs in the 
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slot, and this must therefore be deleted if the 
presupposed item is replaced, whereas in the latter the 
slot is empty--there has been sUbstitution by zero. 
( 145) 
Halliday and Hasan do not offer examples to illustrate 
this difference; however, one might assume that the 
following sentences illustrate how "substitution counter 
occurs in the slot," and how it "must therefore be deleted 
if the presupposed item is replaced" (145): 
[2:34] 
[2:35] 
original: John is building a house. 
sUbstitution: He is building a house. 
(He is the "substitution counter" and presupposes 
John. ) 
By replacing the presupposed item, John, with Sue, one has 
[2:36] 
[2:37] 
original: Sue is building a house. 
sUbstitution: She is building a house. 
Clearly, the sUbstitution counter is not deleted, but 
merely replaced by another sUbstitution counter. Consider 
an example with ellipsis, i.e., sUbstitution by zero: 
[2:38] original: One rabbit ran fast, and another rabbit 
ran slowly. 
[2:39] sUbstitution: One rabbit ran fast, and another 
(zero) ran slowly. 




original: One dog ran fast, and another dog ran 
slowly. 
sUbstitution: One dog ran fast, and another (zero) 
ran slowly. 
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Hence, the structural mechanisms involved are not of 
"two different kinds" (142) unless one assumes the 
"substi tution counters", i. e., the instantiated nominal, 
verbal, clause, or zero items, to differ in non-semantic 
ways; further, the very same structural mechanism occurs, 
viz., the structural operation of sUbstitution of 
co-referential items. Moreover, the underlying semantic 
status, not surface representation, of the "presupposed 
item" and the "substitution counter" is the determining 
factor in this aspect of cohesion: their underlying semantic 
status must be that of co-reference, and it matters not 
whether the substitution counter is zero or an instantiated 
nominal, verbal, or clause. The structural operation which 
effects the substitution is identical, and co-reference of 
the presupposed item and the substitution item ensures 
comprehension. 
Halliday and Hasan also argue that much of the 
distinction between sUbstitution and ellipsis rests on the 
notions of single-element omission and branching clauses. 
Halliday and Hasan hold that single-element omission does 
not occur "WHERE THAT ELEMENT IS OTHERWISE OBLIGATORY" 
(205), as in the following examples: 
[2:42] 
[2:43] 
Has she taken her medicine? 
She has taken. 
(in this unacceptable sentence, the single 
element, the complement, has been omitted) (202) 
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However, one should consider an example of theirs before 
accepting their argument. In the following two sentences, 
the second sentence omits a single element, the complement, 
but according to Halliday and Hasan, this is not ellipsis 
because it is not "an instance of omission, and involves no 
presuppositions of any kind" (204), but rather an example of 
a systematic variant "in which nothing is omitted, any more 
than an expression of time or place can be said to be 
'omitted' from a clause which does not contain one" (204). 
[2:44] Simon's playing. 
[2:45] Let's not interrupt. (204) 
First, it is arguable that something has been omitted 
on two counts. A sui species feature of English is its 
tendency toward the pattern Subject-Verb-Object (or 
Complement); English is commonly referred to as an SVO 
language, and as such, native speakers of English usually 
deem a Subject-Verb sentence incomplete if the verb is used 
in a transitive sense. For example, most native speakers of 
English find incomplete the following utterance if no object 
has been previously identified: 
[2:46] Let's watch. (or Let's not watch.) 
Likewise incomplete is, 
[2:47] Let's interrupt. (or Let's not interrupt.) 
Native speakers would feel something had been omitted in 
[2:46] and in [2:47]. Likewise, if a native speaker is 




Let's not interrupt. 
and then is asked "Let's not interrupt 'what?'" he or she 
will normally answer "Simon" or "simon's playing." 
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Thus, it seems that an omission has occurred in the 
sentence "Let's not interrupt." Halliday and Hasan do not 
explain the term "systematic variant," but whatever it is, 
one cannot deny the native speaker's intuition that an 
omission has occurred in "Let's not interrupt." Although 
the native speaker might not categorize it as such, it is an 
omission of a single element. Moreover, such an omission is 
not the same as the "omission" of "time" or "place" from a 
sentence, since virtually all utterances assume the 
metaphysical constants of time and place. Indeed, that is 
why they are "unmarked" in dialog, and why speakers signify 
a specific, non-metaphysical meaning of time and place by 
using definite, explicit "markers" such as the words here, 
now, there, and then whenever such reference is necessary 
for coherence. 
Much of the rest of the argument that ellipsis is 
something more than zero sUbstitution and hence merits its 
own category lies with ellipsis in question-and-answers such 




Is it Tuesday? 
I don't know. (212) 
Can you make it stand up? 
[2:53] If you keep still. (213 ) 
[2:54] When did they cancel the booking? 
[2:55] Did they? (213 ) 
[2:56] John's coming to dinner. 
[2:57] John? (215) 
[2:58] John's coming to dinner. 
[2:59] And Mary? (215) 
In these cases, Halliday and Hasan do not contest the 




Let's not interrupt. (204) 
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Finally, and perhaps most telling for the composition 
teacher who deals with problems in ellipsis resulting from 
tangled clauses in student writing, Halliday and Hasan argue 






Either Peter will play his cello, or Sally her 
guitar. (203) 
The cat catches mice in the summer. 
-And the dog rabbits. (203) 
The cat won't catch mice in wint.er. 
-Nor the dog rabbits. (203) 
sybil takes coffee very strong, but Joan very 
weak. (203) 
Halliday and Hasan disqualify these sentences from 
exhibiting ellipsis on two grounds: 1) ellipsis for them 
involves "a form of pre-supposition between sentences," not 
within a sentence (203); and 2) the omission deals with the 
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omission of "single elements of clause structure (as well as 
structures of any other rank)," i.e., with structure, and 
"we [Halliday and Hasan] are confining our definition of 
ELLIPSIS to its non-structural, cohesive sense" (203). 
Accordingly, Halliday and Hasan argue that [2:63] and 
[2:64] do not exhibit ellipsis because, in fact, they are 
actually one sentence. 
[2:66] 
[2:67] 
The cat catches mice in the summer. 
-And the dog rabbits. (203) 
The cat won't catch mice in winter. 
-Nor the dog rabbits. (203) 
However, consider the following versions of Julius 



















came; I saw; I 
came, I saw, I 
conquered. 
conquered. 
Is [2:68] three sentences? Most composition teachers would 
probably respond yes. Does ellipsis occur. in example 
[2:68]? Most composition teachers would probably respond 
no. Is [2:69] three sentences? Again, most composition 
teachers would respond yes. Does ellipsis occur in (2:69]? 
Most composition teachers would probably respond yes. Is 
[2:70] three sentences? Here most composition teachers 
might hesitate. Is the semicolon a weak period, making 
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[2:70] three sentences, or is the semicolon a strong comma, 
making [2:70] a single sentence? According to Halliday and 
Hasan, if one views [2:70] as three sentences, then ellipsis 
occurs, but if one views [2:70] as a single sentence, then 
ellipsis does not occur. Is [2:71] three sentences? Most 
composition teachers would respond no, that [2:71] is a 
single sentence. 
Does ellipsis occur in [2:71]? Most composition 
teachers would respond yes, ellipsis does occur. How can 
this be? Does ellipsis, a significant feature of cohesion, 
hinge on whether a string of clauses is separated by 
semi-colons, commas, or periods? Surely not, for the 
semantic relationships are the same in each of the examples. 
Moreover, Halliday and Hasan argue that sentences like those 
below do not exhibit ellipsis because in each case the 
omission deals with the omission of "single elements of 
clause structure (as well as structures of any other rank)," 
and "we [Halliday and Hasan] are confining our definition of 
ELLIPSIS to its non-structural, cohesive sense" (203): 
[2:72] 
[2:73] 
Either Peter will play his cello, or Sally her 
gui tar. ( 2 03 ) 
Sybil takes coffee very strong, but Joan very 
weak. (203) 
However, the position regarding the omission of a single 
element can be countered with Halliday and Hasan's own 
example below in which a single element has been omitted. 
[2:44] Simon's playing. 
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[2:45] Let's not interrupt. (204) 
This argument, as stated earlier, is based on the SVO 
(Complement) tendency in the English language. The native 
speaker intuits that something has been omitted in [2:45] 
and will easily supply a suitable element to "complete" the 
sentence. In addition, such an omission, contrary to 
Halliday and Hasan's position, is not the same as the 
"omission" of "time" or "place" from a sentence, but instead 
is an omission of a situation- specific element unique to 
that speech act. 
In light of the above arguments, and in light of 
Halliday and Hasan's uncertainty over the status of 
ellipsis, I will, for the purposes of this study in global 
coherence, consider ellipsis a form of substitution, and one 
which is achieved through a structural operation involving 
the sUbstitution of a zero item co-referential with the 
presupposed item. (For additional arguments supporting this 
position, one can refer to Dressler, Lakoff, Green, 
Dougherty, and Steinitz.) 
APPENDlxn 
Jerry Fodor's functional taxonomy of cognition may be 
thought of as a cognitive flow among the following 
components: INPUT OF DATA => TRANSDUCER => INPUT SYSTEM 
(MODULE) => CENTRAL SYSTEM. These components are described 
in more detail below. 
INPUT OF DATA consists of data input through any of the 
sensory channels, i.e., visual, auditory, tactile, 
olfactory, or taste. For example, input of data along the 
visual channel would trace the photons as they enter the 
visual channel and make their way through the channel to a 
transducer. 
TRANSDUCERS put all input data into a particular format 
without any change in the content of the data. To quote 
Fodor: transducers "preserve the informational content of 
their inputs, altering only the format in which the 
information is displayed" (41). 
INPUT SYSTEMS (MODULES) "mediate between transducer 
outputs and central cognitive mechanisms by encoding the 
mental representations which provide domains for the 
operations" of the CENTRAL COGNITIVE SYSTEMS (42); modules 
"pair transduced representations with formulas in the 
domains of central processes" (70) involving "mediated 
mappings from transducer outputs onto percepts--mappings 
that are effected via the computation of interlevels of 
representation of the impinging stimulus" (60). The 
following is a descriptive list of the more important 
characteristics of modules: 
informationally encapsulated: there is 
limited, if any, access to information 
outside the module itself during input 
processing 
domain specific: "the range of inputs for 
which [a module] computes analyses" is 
limited (103) 
limited central access: only "the final 
consequences of input processing" are 
available to central systems (56) 
hardwired/stable: "the grain of their 
physical architecture quite closely parallels 
the grain of their virtual architecture [sets 
of programming instructions]" (37) 
computationally autonomous: all that is 
necessary for performance of the 
inference-like operations is contained in the 
module's neuro-anatomy 
computationally local: stimulus driven; 
insensitive to an individual's belief system; 
a module may not access other modules during 
processing, but may access memory at or near 
completion of the process 
shallow outputs: e.g., "the visual analysis 
system can report only upon the shapes and 
colors of things," not about photons (this 
demarcates perception and cognition: "all 
higher-level integrations," i.e., above 
shapes and colors of things, is 
post-perceptual) 
not assembled: not constructed of simpler, 
more basic systems 
mandatory: the individual has no choice in 
a module's operation 
fast: much faster than the 250 milliseconds 
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required for shadowing (repeating what one is hearing) 
specific breakdown pattern: a pathology can 
cause a module to malfunction and evince 
behavior peculiar to the module, e.g, agnosia 
or aphasia 
Modules, then, are "computationally elaborated" (83) 
and work from the sensory channels and language. Each 
module acts as a computational-confirmational mechanism 
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"which projects and confirms a certain class of hypotheses 
on the basis of a certain body of data" (68). 
An available hypothesis might be a word sequence that 
could be constructed from "entries in the subjects's mental 
lexicon" (68). Such a hypothesis (which would be lexical), 
is paired with input sensory data; this pair is given a 
value "which expresses the degree of confirmation" that the 
sense datum "bestows" upon the lexical hypothesis (68). 
Once the hypothesis is constructed and given a value, 
the input system can access a central system (e.g., memory) 
to confirm that the input may very well represent a panther 
or a convertible (often invoking a basic category), or a 
sentence type/logical linguistic form. This confirmation 
informs the subject what has been said, but not what has 
been meant. 
Another way to view the module as an inference-
performing system is in a premise/conclusion relationship: 
premises are "transduced representations of proximal 
stimulus configurations" (e.g., a transduction of 
information resulting from input of photons); conclusions 
are "representations of the character and distribution of 
179 
distal objects" (e.g., a representation of a panther as it 
appears in the world of things) (42). 
central systems subsume modules and fixate belief 
(perceptual and non-perceptual) by monitoring what modules 
deliver, by accessing memory, and then by computing a "best 
hypothesis" concerning "what the world is like" (104). 
The following is a list of some of the more important 
characteristics of central systems, many of which are the 
inverse of modular characteristics: 
not hardwired/unstable: neuroanatomy 
"relatively diffuse (118) 
quasi assembled: a larger system composed 
of simpler systems 
informationally unencapsulated: central 
systems access information from each other 
and from modules 
domain neutral: "cut across cognitive 
domains" (101) 
computationally global: may draw on other 
central systems or modules to perform 
operations 
sensitive to belief system: during 
computation, central systems consider an 
individual's set of beliefs 
isotropic: confirmation-relevant facts can 
be "drawn from anywhere in the field 'of 
previously established empirical truths" (105) 
Quineian: "the degree of confirmation 
assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive 
to properties of the entire belief system; as 
it were, the shape of our whole science bears 
on the epistemic status of each scientific 
hypothesis" (107) 
optional engagement: the operation of a 
central system is not necessarily mandatory, 
but can be elective 
variable speed: may be very slow or 
instantaneous 
Here, it is posited that the above described central 
systems may be thought of as central cognitive processes, 
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i.e., specific central systems which possess distinguishing 
characteristics of their own while simultaneously possessing 
all the characteristics detailed above. 
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